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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Plaintiff/Appellee \ 
vs. : 
SHANE DOYLE J 
Defendant/Appellant ; 
: Case No. 950383-CA 
\ Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f) 
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital 
felony. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The overriding issue presented here is: Whether the trial 
court erred in denying Doyle's Motion to Suppress the Evidence on 
grounds that the search of Doyle was unconstitutional. Appellate 
review for the denial of such a motion is conducted in a 
bifurcated manner—the trial court's subsidiary and factual 
determinations are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard 
while its legal conclusions are reviewed for "correctness". See 
State v. Ribe, 876 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State 
v* Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Thurman, 846 
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P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 
n.3 (Utah 1991)). 
More specifically Doyle presents for appellate review the 
following issues arising from the denial of his Motion to 
Suppress: 
1. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that the 
authority-granting paragraph in the search warrant executed in 
this case was neither unconstitutionally vague or overbroad? 
This issue presents a question of law which should be reviewed 
for "correctness". State v, Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that the 
warrant as executed was constitutional? This issue likewise 
presents a question of law which should be reviewed for 
"correctness". State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
These issues were preserved for appeal by a Conditional Plea 
Agreement (R. 55-58), a written Motion to Suppress (R. 38) 
accompanied by a Memorandxim of Points and Authorities (R. 24-38), 
and a Suppression Hearing (R. 126-163). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Utah Constitution, Article I, section 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
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seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue 
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-201 (1995) 
A search warrant is an order issued by a magistrate in the 
name of the state and directed to a peace officer, 
describing with particularity the thing, place, or person to 
be searched and the property or evidence to be seized by him 
and brought before the magistrate (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-203 (1995) 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable 
cause supported by oath or affirmation particularly 
describing the person or place to be searched and the 
person, property, or evidence to be seized (emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendant, Shane Doyle, Entered a conditional "no concest" 
plea to Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a 
second degree felony, in Fourth District Court. Doyle now 
appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition 
On November 29, 1994, the Defendant, Shane Doyle was 
charged, by information, with three counts of controlled 
substance violations (R. 6-7). On December 15, 1994, a 
preliminary hearing was held and Doyle was subsequently bound-
over to the Fourth District Court for arraignment on Counts I and 
III (R. 8, 79-125). At arraignment, the Honorable Boyd L. Park 
presiding, Doyle entered a plea of "not guilty" to both counts 
(R. 10). 
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Doyle filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence on January 17, 
1995, on grounds that the search warrant executed in this matter 
was unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Doyle (R. 18). 
On January 31, 1995, a suppression hearing was held in Fourth 
District Court before Judge Park (R. 126-163). At the close of 
the hearing, the court denied Doyle's motion to suppress (R. 45) 
and a written order was later filed by the district court on May 
8, 1995 (R. 67-69). 
On February 10, 1995, Doyle filed a certified Conditional 
Plea of "no contest" to Count I, Possession of Methamphetamine in 
a Drug Free Zone, a second degree felony, in order to preserve 
his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion (R. 49-
58). In return, the State dismissed Count II (R. 51). The 
Fourth District Court approved the plea (R. 55-58) and Doyle was 
subsequently placed on thirty-six (36) months probation on April 
27, 1995 (R. 65-66). 
On May 25, 1995, Doyle filed a Notice of Appeal with the 
Fourth District Court challenging the trial court's denial of his 
motion to suppress (R. 73). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In September and October of 1994, the Provo Police 
Department received tips—from an anonymous caller and from a 
confidential informant—that Steven and Angela Hundley were using 
and selling cocaine; and that Steven Hundley was dealing drugs at 
Mountain States Steel, his place of employment (R. 28). 
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On November 7, 1994, Officer Jerry Harper and other Provo 
Police officers searched the trash can at 255 North 1600 West, 
#121 in Provo—the address of Steven and Angela Hundley—and 
allegedly found drug paraphernalia with residue, marijuana leaves 
and stems, and correspondence to Steven and Angela Hundley (R. 
28). 
An Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant (with the 
heading "State of Utah, Plaintiff vs. Steven Hundley, Angela 
Hundley, 255 N. 1600 W., #121 Provo, UT Defendants") containing 
the aforementioned information was submitted by Officer Harper to 
the Honorable John C. Backlund, Fourth Circuit Court (R. 26-29). 
The affidavit requested a no-knock, daytime warrant which 
authorized "the search of the- mobile home, together with the 
curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the 
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at 
the time of search for presence ot controlled substances together 
with associated paraphernalia" (R. 26). 
Under the same heading, a search warrant was issued by Judge 
Backlund on November 8, 1994 (R. 24-25). The search warrant 
authorized a search of the Hundley residence, a mobile-home (R. 
24). In addition, the warrant authorized the "search of any 
outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any 
individuals present at the time of the execution of this warrant" 
(R. 24, 102). 
At approximately 5:00 p.m. on November 11, 1994, officers of 
the Provo Police department's Narcotics Enforcement Team pulled 
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up in a van and served a warrant at the Hundley mobile-home 
located at 255 N 1600 W #121 in Provo (R. 82-83). 
When the officers searched the trailer, the only persons 
present were Steve and Angela Hundley and a child, inside the 
trailer (R. 88). The officers video-taped the search (R. 88). 
They found incriminating evidence against the Hundleys, collected 
the evidence, packed it up along with the video camera (R. 90-91) 
and took the Hundleys away in a police car (R. 114). 
Based on officers' testimony, a white Escort, driven by Teri 
Olsen with Doyle as a passenger (R. 92-93), arrived at the 
Hundley residence anywhere from 40 to 75 minutes (R. 89 and 115) 
after the arrival of the officers and the execution of the 
warrant. Officer Shawn Adamson testified that when Doyle and 
Olsen arrived, the Hundley's had been arrested and transported, 
and the child had been picked-up (R. 114).x 
Olsen parked her car on the public street across from the 
trailer in front of another trailer (R. 89). Doyle came to the 
door of trailer #121 and entered the trailer (R. 116). An 
officer searched Doyle, found paraphernalia on his person, and 
placed him under arrest (R. 116). 
The officers then crossed the street and searched Olsen's 
vehicle. One officer removed a jacket from between the seats, 
took a cassette from the jacket and placed it on the floor (R. 
lOfficer Denton Johnston's police reported stated: "At the completion of the search 
warrant two other individuals arrived at the home. A Shane Doyle and Terri Olsen arrived" 
(R. 90). 
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105). Another officer opened the case and found three baggies of 
methamphetamine (R. 101). At that point the officers 
interrogated Doyle and he admitted that the drugs were his (R. 
110). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A general warrant was executed in this case authorizing the 
search of "the person of any individuals present at the time of 
the execution of this warrant." However, neither the warrant nor 
its accompanying affidavit contained evidence, as required by 
case law, of sufficient particularity in the probable cause sense 
to support the conclusion that it is probable anyone in the 
described place when the warrant is executed is involved in the 
criminal activity. Nor did the warrant or its affidavit contain 
any independent probable cause relating specifically to Doyle as 
required by the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, the 
warrant in this esse is impermissibly overbroad and violates both 
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution and the trial court must 
be reversed. 
Moreover, if this court finds that the warrant executed in 
this case is not facially invalid, the search of Doyle's person 
was not supported by any independent probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion that he was engaging in criminal activity. Therefore, 
his mere arrival at the Hundley residence during the execution of 
the search warrant is insufficient to justify the search of his 
person. Therefore, the search of Doyle was an unconstitutional 
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violation of his "right to be secure in his person..• from 
unreasonable searches and seizures" under both the United States 
and the Utah Constitutions. Accordingly, any evidence obtained 
as a result of that search—including evidence obtained by his 
incriminating statements or the subsequent search of the vehicle 
in which he arrived at the vicinity—must be suppressed and the 
trial court's denial of Doyle's motion to suppress must be 
reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 14 are linguistically indistinguishable. Both 
secure "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." 
Nevertheless, pursuant to the primacy model of 
constitutional interpretation, the Utah Constitution should be 
the primary source for protecting citizen's rights. A state 
court must first look to the state constitution and develop 
independent doctrine and precedent. Federal questions are 
decided only when state law is not dispositive. West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 1994) (quoting Christine M. 
Durham, Employing the Utah Constitution in the Utah Courts, Utah 
B.J., Nov. 1989, 25, 26). See also Amax Magnesium Corp v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1261 (Utah 1990)("[I]f the challenged 
statute cannot withstand attack under the state constitution, 
there is no reason to reach the federal question"). Therefore, 
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the federal search and seizure law need not be addressed until 
after the state analysis applicable to Article I, Section 14. 
The identical language of the Fourth Amendment and Article 
I, § 14 would seem to dictate an identical analytical framework. 
However, the Utah Supreme Court has encouraged a reading of 
Article I, § 14 which is different and more expansive than its 
federal counterpart. 
In State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, (Utah 1990) the 
court stated in dicta "An increasing number of state courts are 
relying on an analysis of the search and seizure provisions of 
their own constitutions to expand or maintain constitutional 
protection beyond the scope mandated by the fourth amendment." 
In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, (Utah 1988) the court 
said, "Indeed, choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat 
different construction may prove to be an appropriate method for 
insulauing this state's citizens from the vagaries of 
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by 
federal courts." Finally, in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 
(Utah 1985) the Court determined "The federal law as it currently 
exists is certainly not the only permissible interpretation of 
the search and seizure protection contained in the Utah 
Constitution. If... we conclude that we can strike a balance 
between the competing interests involved so as to better serve 
them all, then we should no hesitate to do so." 
Utah courts have been willing to foster a state primacy 
model for analyzing constitutional questions because of our 
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state's unique history. The difficulties Utah encountered before 
obtaining statehood were not experienced by surrounding 
territories. Due to the settlers utilization of polygamy and 
other peculiar religious practices, Congress looked unfavorably 
upon the territory's application for statehood. Utah settlers 
had endured violent expulsion from their homes before leaving 
Missouri and would presumably have tolerated relatively little 
tolerance for warrantless searches and unbridled state action. 
Because the basis for the enactment of Article I, § 14 comes 
from a different perspective than the Fourth Amendment,to the 
United States Constitution, Utah courts have often allowed a more 
expansive and consistent reading of our state provision than the 
federal version allows. Consequently, Defendant requests that 
this court analyze the constitutional propriety of the search in 
this case in light of both the federal and state constitutional 
provisions. 
POINT I 
THE WARRANT EXECUTED IS OVERBROAD AND VIOLATES BOTH THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
ARTICLE I, § 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In addition to protecting people from unreasonable searches 
and seizures, both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 14 
indicate that no warrant shall issue "but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized19 
(emphasis added)- Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-23-201, 203 also 
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require that both the warrant and the initial oath or affirmation 
providing the probable cause provide a "particular" description 
of the persons, places or things to be searched and the property 
or evidence to be seized. 
In this case, the authority-granting paragraph in the search 
warrant executed here gave officers the right to search the 
Hundley's residence and "any outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, 
and the person of any individuals present at the time of the 
execution of this warrant" (R. 24, 102). While the Hundley's 
residence is described in great detail, neither the warrant nor 
the accompanying affidavit, give a particularized description of 
the "outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles or persons present" that 
are also subject, to the search (R. 24-25, 26-29). 
While general warrants such as the one executed in this case 
are not unconstitutional per se. Courts have recognized, 
however, the dangers of general "all persons" warrants being 
misused for overbroad purposes. See State v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 
774, 776 (Minn. 1985). Because of this danger, courts have held 
that the constitution places limitations on the use of such 
general warrants. Most importantly, the United States Supreme 
Court has held: 
where the standard is probable cause a search or seizure of 
a person must be supported by probable cause particularized 
with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be 
undercut or avoided by simple pointing to the fact that 
coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or 
seize another or to search the premises where the person may 
happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect 
the "legitimate expectation of privacy" of persons, not 
places. 
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Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (holding a search of 
all customers in a bar to be unconstitutionally overbroad). 
Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "an 
individual's mere presence at a place named in a search warrant 
does not automatically subject the individual to a personal 
search." State v. Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 1167 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citing United States v. Pi Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948)). 
State courts in Minnesota, Massachusetts, and New Jersey 
have also dealt with the issue of "general 'all persons' search 
warrants" such as the one at hand. See State v. Anderson, 415 
N.W.2d 57 (Minn. App. 1987); State v. Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774 
(Minn. 1985); Commonwealth v. Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1976); 
and State v. De Simone, 288 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1972). 
In 1972, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. De 
Simone, 288 A.2d 849, developed a "nexus" test to gauge the 
constitutionality of a general warrant. State courts in 
Minnesota and Massachusetts have adopted this approach. See 
Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. App. 1987); Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d 774 
(Minn. 1985); and Smith, 348 N.E.2d 101 (Mass. 1976). 
The De Simone court's holding has been summarized as 
requiring "a sufficient nexus between the criminal activity, the 
place of the activity, and the persons in the place to show 
probable cause." Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d at 776. This "nexus" has 
been repeatedly described as "whether there is sufficient 
particularity in the probable cause sense, that is, whether the 
information supplied the magistrate supports the conclusion that 
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it is probable anyone in the described place when the warrant is 
executed is involved in the criminal activity in such a way as to 
have evidence thereof on his person." Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 
60; Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d at 776 (quoting 2 W. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 4.5 at 92 (1978)). See also, Smith, 348 N.E.2d at 107. 
In State v. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. App. 1987), the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals was faced with a fact pattern almost 
identical to the one at hand. In Anderson, a search warrant was 
executed at a residence after tips from a confidential informant 
of illegal drug activities taking place at the residence. 
Included in the warrant was authorization to search "any persons 
present at the residence at the time the search is executed." 
Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 58. 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on the day of its issuance, the 
search warrant was executed on the residence, drugs and 
paraphernalia were found, and the occupants were arrested. 
Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 58. At approximately 7:Of p.m., while 
the officers were searching the livingroom, Anderson came to the 
residence. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 58. He was allowed into the 
residence by the officers. He was then searched, found in 
possession of cocaine and drug paraphernalia, and arrested. 
Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 59. 
The trial court suppressed the evidence on grounds that the 
search of Anderson pursuant to the warrant's "all persons" clause 
was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 59-60. The Minnesota Court 
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of Appeals, like the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Hinkel, 
adopted the De Simone "nexus" test and concluded that the test 
had not been met. Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 60f 61. The court 
based its holding on the facts that 
this was a search of a house used as a residence in a 
residential neighborhood. The search was conducted in the 
afternoon. Thus, there could be no inference that everyone 
coming into the house could reasonably be suspected of 
criminal activity. As respondent [Anderson] noted, any 
number of people, for example, paper boys, deliverymen, 
mailmen, friends, or relatives, could have had legitimate 
reasons for being on the premises. 
Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 61. 
The general warrant in this case, like that in Anderson, is 
violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. The 
"all-persons" authorization in the warrant is unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it lacks "sufficient particularity in the 
probable cause sense... [to] support the [magistrate's] 
conclusion that it is probable anyone in the described place when 
the warrant is executed is involved in the criminal activity." 
Anderson, 415 N.W.2d at 60; Hinkel, 365 N.W.2d at 776. 
Both the search warrant and the initial Affidavit in this 
case name both Steven and Angela Hundley (R. 24-25, 26-29). All 
of the information gained—from the confidential informant, the 
anonymous caller, and the search of the trash can—in support of 
the presence of drugs and the need for a warrant refers only to 
the Hundley's (R. 26-29). In addition, the Affidavit itself 
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states that "The amounts of residue and marijuana in the garbage 
imply small amounts for use" (R. 27). 
No where in the search warrant or the accompanying affidavit 
does Doyle's name appear; nor as required by Ybarra and Jackson 
is there any evidence of probable cause particularized to Doyle. 
Moreover, neither the affidavit nor the warrant provide 
sufficient probable cause of wide-spread criminal activity to 
support the constitutional issuance of a general all-persons 
warrant in this case. 
Therefore, this court should "correct" the legal conclusion 
of the trial court that "The authority-granting paragraph in the 
warrant in its totality is neither too broad or vague" (R. 68) 
and remand the case witn instructions that the charges are to be 
dismissed as a result of the "unreasonable search" of Doyle's 
person. 
POINT II 
THE TRiAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION 
THAT THE WARRANT AS EXECUTED HAS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
General warrants that meet the constitutional requirements 
set forth above, may, nonetheless/ produce unreasonable searches 
and seizures if their execution exceeds the scope of their 
authorization. See Knight v. State, 566 So.2d 8 (Fla. App. 
1990). Just as a general warrant requires sufficient 
particularity to support a probable cause finding of wide-spread 
criminal activity, execution of a general warrant requires 
sufficient particularity to support independent probable cause or 
15 
a reasonable suspicion that the subject of the search is engaging 
in criminal activity. See State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 
1986) ("[P]olice officers are [not] authorized to search an 
individual merely because that person is present on premises for 
which a search has been authorized unless there is some 
independent probable cause to justify a search of the 
individual.") See also Knight v. State, 566 So.2d 8 (Fla. App. 
1990); People v. Redmiles, 547 N.E.2d 724 (111. App. 1989). 
A. The Search of Doyle's person was unconstitutional. 
In Knight v. State, 566 So.2d 8 (Fla. App. 1990), a Florida 
appellate court was faced with almost the identical case which is 
now before this court. The facts in Knight are that defendant 
entered a conditional plea of guilt after his motion to suppress 
the evidence obtained from the search of his person was denied. 
Knight, 566 So.2d at 8. The trial court upheld the search 
because the search warrant authorized the seerch of the premises 
and "all persons therein who shall be participating in said 
criminal activity." Id. 
In Knight, like in this case, a search warrant vaz executed 
on a residence after information of drug activity had been 
received by the police from a confidential informant. Id. 
During the execution of the warrant the police found drugs, 
paraphernalia and weapons. Id. The search was almost complete 
when the defendant, who was not the owner of the premises, 
entered the home and was subsequently searched by police and 
arrested for possession of cocaine found in his pocket. Id. No 
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evidence was presented to the court which "established whether 
[defendant] had any prior connection with the residence or knew 
prior to entering the residence what activities were taking place 
inside." Id. 
The Florida court held that absent such evidence, "the mere 
fact that the defendant entered the premises while a search 
warrant was being executed is insufficient to establish 
reasonable suspicion of participation in criminal activity." 
Anderson, 566 So.2d at 9 (citations omitted). The court then 
reversed and remanded the case with directions to suppress the 
evidence and dismiss the charges. 
Like the defendant in Knight, Doyle entered the Hundley 
residence while a search warrant containing a general "all-
persons" authorization clause was being executed (R. 116). Like 
Charles Knight, Doyle arrived at the residence after the arrival 
of the police and the initial execution of the variant. The 
court in Knight found that, the defendant appeared "when tho 
search was almost complete." Knight, 566 So.2d at 8. Here the 
evidence shows Uiat Doyle appeared at the Hundley residence 
between 40 and 75 minutes after initial execution of the warrant 
(R. 89, 115). Evidence further shows that when Doyle arrived, 
evidence found at the residence had been seized, the Hundley's 
had been arrested and transported, their child had been picked-
up, and the officers and put-away the video cameras (R. 90-91, 
114). 
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More importantly, like in Knight, there is no evidence in 
this case to suggest that Doyle had any prior connection with the 
residence or that he knew prior to entering the residence what 
activities were taking place inside. As a result, Doyle's mere 
arrival at the premises during the possible execution of a 
general warrant is "insufficient to establish [the required] 
reasonable suspicion of [his] participation in criminal activity. 
Knight, 566 So.2d at 9. See also, State v. Jackson. 873 P.2d 
2166, 1167 (Utah App. 1994) ("An individual's mere presence at a 
place named in a search warrant does not automatically subject 
the individual to a personal search."). Likewise, the evidence 
in this case is inadequate to support the finding of independent 
probable cause required by State v. Banks, see supra, to justify 
the search of Doyle's person. Cf. State v. Redmiles, 547 N.E.2d 
724 (111. App. 1989) (Defendant's suspicious behavior created a 
sufficient connection to the premises and the probable cause 
required to search defendant). 
Because the search of Doyle's person was conducted without 
independent probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, it was an unreasonable search and seizure in violation 
of tho Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution that cannot be justified 
by his mere arrival at a residence during the execution of a 
general warrant. 
Moreover, absent the illegally obtained evidence obtained 
from the search of Doyle's person, there was no independent 
18 
probable cause justifying either his arrest or a search of the 
vehicle in which he arrived at the residence• As a result, the 
evidence found as a result of the impermissible search, including 
any statements made by Doyle after the search/ must be suppressed 
as fruits of the poisonous tree. Wong Sun v. United States. 371 
U.S. 471 (1963). 
Accordingly/ this court should "correct" the trial court's 
conclusion that "up to the point in time when the officers leave/ 
they have the right to search a person who comes to that door and 
then enters into that property" (R. 68) and remand the case to 
the district court with instructions to suppress the evidence and 
dismiss the charges. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the aforementioned reasons/ this court should find that 
the general warrant executed in this case was unconstitutionally 
overbroad. Alternatively this court should find that the oea^cn 
of Doyle was not supported by independent probable cau?e, and v*as 
therefore, an unreasonable search and seizure. Regardless of the 
grounds, this court should reverse the trial court's denial of 
Doyle's Motion to Suppress and remand the case to the Fourth 
District Court with directions to suppress the evidence and 
dismiss the charges. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S^ day of September, 1995. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant 
KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 E. CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
STEVEN HUNDLEY 
ANGELA HUNDLEY 
2 3 5 N. T 5 T O - W T - # 1 2 1 
PROVO, UT 
Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
A SEARCH WARRANT 
C r i m i n a l No, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
:ss, 
) 
Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes 
and states as follows: 
1 . I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have 
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the 
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During 
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours 
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185 
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes I 
have taken include training in surveillance, operation of 
surveillance and electronic investigatory equipment, fie]d testing 
of drugs and drug recognition. As an officer I have participated 
in hundreds of operations involving the undercover purchase of 
narcotics and/or the arrest of person for substance abuse related 
violations. I have experience working undercover providing first 
hand experience with narcotics trafficking. I have supervised 
narcotics investigations for the Provo Police Department since 
1992. I am currently designated as the department 
trainer/specialist in the areas of fingerprinting, surveillance, 
video equipment, narcotics and drug recognition. 
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2. On Sept. 21, 1994 Lt. Dave Bolda of the Provo City Police 
Department received an anonymous phone call that Defendants are 
using and selling cocaine. The caller indicated Defendants' 
address as being 255 N. 1600 W. #121, Provo, Utah, Utah County. 
The anonymous caller also indicated that Defendant Steven Hundley 
is dealing heavily at his place of employment, that being Mountain 
States Steel. 
3. That during the month of October, 1994 Officer Jensen of 
the Provo City Police Department received information from a 
Confidential Informant that Defendant Steven Hundley is selling 
cocaine. 
4. Your affiant believes the Confidential Informant who 
spoke to Officer Jensen to be reliable in that the Confidential 
Informant has supplied law enforcement with information in the past 
that has proven reliable. 
5. Provo City has a solid waste collection system. Each 
home is assigned a specific can which is owned by the City. An 
additional can may be obtained for an additional fee. Once per 
week, the cans are to be placed at curbside or in the street for 
collection. A City truck then mechanically picks up and empties 
the can. 
6. That on Nov. 7, 1994 in the early morning hours, your 
affiant and other officers responded to the residence located at 
2 55 N. 1600 W. #121 in Provo. There was one can placed in the 
street for collection at that location with the numeral ll121" 
stencilled on the side. Your affiant took the can to the Provo 
Police Department where the contents were reviewed. After your 
affiant finished, the remaining contents were placed in the can and 
the can returned to the street in front of the residence at 2 55 N. 
1600 W. #121. 
7. Within the can, officers found paraphernalia associated 
with the ingestion of methamphetamine. A chemical reagent test was 
used on a piece of paraphernalia, that being a piece of charred 
glass, which showed positive for methamphetamine. Also found in 
the garbage were marijuana stems and leaf fragments. A chemical 
reagent test was used on a leaf fragment which showed positive for 
marijuana. Other parts of paraphernalia found were syringes, 
baggies, and butane fuel canisters. Also found in the garbage was 
correspondence listing the address 255 N. 1600 W. #121 and also 
listing the names Steven Hundley and Angie Hundley. 
8. The amounts of residue and marijuana in the garbage 
imply small amounts for use. Such amounts of marijuana and 
methamphetamine are typically packaged in baggies of 1/8 oz. or 
less for marijuana, and one gram bindles for methamphetamine, quite 
small in volume. Such baggies and bindles can quickly and easily 
be hidden in the clothing or be destroyed if intent is given to 
search. Moreover, it is your affiant's experience that persons 
with a potentially violent disposition may react with violence if 
confronted with a search. One of the side effects of 
methamphetamine use is an increase in violent behavior. Entry 
without notice allows officers to secure the residence and secure 
officer safety. 
9. Marijuana, methamphetamine, and paraphernalia are often 
kept in outlying vehicles and buildings. Failure to search the 
curtilage of the residence, together with the person of individuals 
present, and vehicles located on the curtilage at the time of the 
execution of the search, will likely result in officers missing 
important evidence. 
10. It is your affiant's experience that most of the people 
I have encountered with the unlawful use of 
marijuana/methamphetamine also .occasionally sell, sometimes paying 
for their use with profits from sales. It is so common as to be 
the rule rather than the exception, to find evidence related to 
production and/or distribution when controlled substances are 
located in a residence. 
11. The residence is more particularly described as a single-
wide mobile home located at 255 N. 1600 W. , Provo, Utah. The 
mobile home is in the south end of the mobile park located jn a 
corner, that corner being a south west corner. The mobile home is 
cream colored with brown trim with the main entrance facing south. 
The numerals ,I121M are located on the east side and the south side 
of the mobile home, 
12. Your affiant expects to locate additional controlled 
substances in the residence, together with associated 
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, u^e, production, or distribution of marijuana a^d 
methamphetamine. 
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Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by 
this court authorizing the search of the mobile home, together with 
the curtilage and the person of all individuals present within the 
home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at said residence at 
the time of search for presence of controlled substances together 
with associated paraphernalia including items used or capable of 
being used for the storage, use, production or distribution of 
controlled substances to be executed without notice of intent or 
authority in the daytime. 
Dated t h i s 
Q& 
day of OofeohcE- 1994 A.M. 
4Asp&\J 
per 
c i a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s 
Subscribed and sworn before me on the _ ^irU 
K M. 
day of 
MAGISTRATE 
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ADDENDUM 2 
Search Warrant 
KAY BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
100 EAST CENTER, SUITE 2100 
PROVO, UTAH 84601 
PHONE: (801) 370-8026 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, : , 
vs. : SEARCH WARRANT 
STEVEN HUNDLEY : Criminal No. 
ANGELA HUNDLEY 
255 N. 1600 W. #121 
PROVO, UT 
Defendants 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY PEACE OFFICER OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Magistrate's It has been established by oath or 
indorsement affirmation made or submitted to me this 
I day of November, 1994 that there is 
^ 
3* 
m 
4h. 
probable cause to believe the following: 
1. The property described below: 
was unlawfully acquired or unlawfully possessed; 
has been used or is possessed for the purpose of 
being used to commit or conceal the commission of 
an offense; or 
is evidence of illegal conduct. 
2. The property described below is most probably 
located at the premises also set forth below. 
3. The person or entity in possession of the property 
is a party to the alleged illegal conduct. 
4. That this warrant may be served without notice of 
intent or authority to search, due to the fact that 
the property to be searched for may be 'easily 
secreted, disposed of, or destroyed if notice of 
intent to search is given• h\-^ri/:V\/PWv '^  
5. That this warrant may be served in the day time 
hours. 
NOW, THEREFORE, YOU AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to conduct 
a search of the a residence described as a single-wide mobile home 
located at 255 N. 1600 W., Provo, Utah. The mobile home is in the 
south end of the mobile park located on a corner, that corner being 
a south west corner. The mobile home is cream colored with brown 
trim with the main entrance facing south. The numerals "121" are 
located on the east side and the south side of the mobile home. 
Your are also hereby directed to search of any outbuildings, 
curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any individuals present at 
the time of the execution of this warrant. 
You are directed to search for the presence of the following 
property: controlled substances, together with associated 
paraphernalia, including items used or capable of being used for 
the storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana and 
methamphetamine. 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring 
the property forthwith before me at the above court or to hold the 
same in your possession pending further order of this court. You 
are instructed to leave a receipt for the property with the person 
in whose possession the property is found or at the premises where 
the property was located. After execution of the warrant you shall 
promptly make a verified return of the warrant to me together with 
a written inventory of any property seized identifying the place 
where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT MUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS FROM THE DATE 
OF ISSUANCE. 
DATED this J day of November, 1994, 
MAGISTRATE 
¥> 
ADDENDUM 3 
Transcript of Preliminary Hearing 
^mciVftl 
UTAH COUNTY 
RTMENT 
IN THE FOURT4tf^j|^W»¥WcOURT 0 F 
STATE Orij%WCHHMTOREM DEPA 
**Hw Origiria1 STATE OF UTAH, 
vs . 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 941-1347 
c
{m%o %i°i 
Defendant . 
Preliminary Hearing 
Electronically recorded on 
December 15, 1994 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH I. DIMICK 
Fourth Circuit Court Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
For the State: 
For the Defendant 
Craic; Madsen 
Deputy County Attorney 
100 East Center Street 
Suite 2}0 0 
Prove, Utah 84605 
Telephone: (801)370-8026 
i l i .5J ia jLL.-JLewei l 
Utah County Public Defender 
40 South 100 West 
Suite 200 
Trovo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801)379-2570 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
CENTER COURT REPORTING 
P, O. BOX 1786 
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786 
TELEPHONE: ( 8 0 1 ) 2 2 4 - 9 8 4 7 
JUN 2 9 1995 
COURT OF APPPAl c 
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HL&EjjL 
WITNESS: DENTON JOHNSTON PAGE 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MADSEN 4 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. JEWELL 8 
WITNESS: DEVON JENSEN 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MADSEN 19 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. JEWELL 22 
WITNESS: DENTON JOHNSTON (Recalled) 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MADSEN 26 
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. JEWELL 28 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MADSEN 29 
WITNESS: SHAWN ADAMSON 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MADSEN 31 
CROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. JEWELL 32 
WITNESS: DENTON JOHNSTON (Recalled) 
REDIHECT EXAMINATION BY: MR. MADSEN 43 
RECROSS EXAMINATION BY: MR. JEWELL 43 
-oOo-
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 15, 1994) 
3 THE COURT: Let's move on to State versus 
4 Shane Doyle, Is the defense ready? 
5 MR, JEWELL: We are, your Honor. 
6 THE COURT: Is the State? 
7 MR. MADSEN: Yes, we are. 
8 THE COURT: Anything preliminary? 
9 MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I think that we'd 
I 
10| ask the Court to invoke the exclusionary rule at 
11 this time. 
12 THE COURT: Would you call your witnesses, 
13 please. 
14 MR. MADSEN: Devon Jensen, Russ Billings, 
15 Denton Johnston, Shawn Adamson. I believe that's 
16 all. 
17 THE COURT: Who arc yon going to call 
18| first? 
i 
19! MS. MADSEN: Denton Jcnnston. 
20 THE COURT: Do you want anybody for 
21 assistance? 
22 MR. MADSEN: When he's finished I'll have 
23 him remain. 
24 THE COURT: I want to ask the other three 
25 of you to stay out of earshot and not to discuss 
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1 the case while you're out. Thank you, 
2 MR. MADSEN: State calls Denton Johnston. 
31 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
4| the testimony you're about to give in the case now 
pending before this Court will be the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
MR. MADSEN: Can I question him seated 
10! ( inaudible) . 
THE COURT: Sure. 
DENTON JOHNSTON, 
having been first duly sworn, 
testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
3Y MR. MADSEN: 
Q. Wili you please state yo^r full name and 
your occupation. 
A. My name is Denton Johnston. I'm a police 
sergeant for the City of Orem. 
Q. Did you assist in the execution of a 
search warrant on the 11th day of November of this 
year at approximately 5 o'clock (inaudible)? 
A. I did. 
Q. Where did that take place? 
! 
11 
13 
14 
15 
16 
13 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
82 
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1 A- It took place at 255 North 1600 West in 
2 Provo at trailer No. 121. 
3 THE COURT: Say again. 
4 THE WITNESS: It was at 255 North 1600 
5 West, trailer No. 121 in Provo. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 Q. BY MR. MADSEN: Did your warrant include 
8 vehicles of individuals present during the 
9 execution of the warrant? 
10 A. Yes, it did, 
11 MR. JEWELL: Objection, your Honor. Did he 
12i have the warrant present (inaudible). 
13 THE COURT: I didn't hear the question. 
14 MR. MADSEN: The warrant provided for the 
15 search of the vehicles of any individuals present 
LSj during the execution of the warrant. 
THE COURT: And your objectjon. 
2 9| MR. JEWELL: My objection it's hearsay. 
19i The warrant: speaks for itself. 
20 THE COURT: Well, at a hearing where the 
21 content of the warrant could be suppressed and 
22 where the results received from it could be 
23 suppressed I think that's a pretty good motion. 
24 For preliminary hearing I think it's a short forum 
25 that it's okay. Your answer. 
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l| THE WITNESS: May he repeat the question. 
2 Q. BY MR. MADSEN: Yes. Did the warrant 
3 provide for the search of the vehicles of the 
4 individuals present during the execution of the 
5 warrant? 
6 A. Yes, it did. 
7 Q. And didn't in fact a vehicle arrive during 
8 the execution of the warrant? 
9 A. Yes, it did. 
10 Q. Who was the operator of the vehicle? 
ill A. A young lady named Teri Olsen. 
12 Q. Who was present with Teri Olsen? 
13J A. There was the defendant Shane Doyle. 
14 There was also a 12-year-old girl I don't have the 
15 name of who they had brought over to babysit two 
11"i smaller children that were also in the car. 
l'; Q. Was any property removed f;. on r.hr. t 
18 vehicle? 
19i A. During the search or what? 
20 Q. During the search of the vehicle. 
21 A. Yes, there was. There was a brown leather 
22 jacket. 
23 Q. Did you personally examine the contents of 
24 the jacket? 
25 A. Yes, I did. 
j \^ 'j 84 
1[ Q. What was inside the jacket? 
2| A, Inside the jacket there was what I 
3 determined to be drug paraphernalia. There was a 
4 small butane canister. Along with the butane 
5 canister there was a small pencil-like butane 
6 torch. There was also a cassette tape that at that 
7 time I passed over. There was a -- I believe that 
8 was all the paraphernalia that I located within the 
9| jacket. 
10 Q. Were you able to determine to whom the 
11 jacket belonged? 
12 A. Yes, there was also a note inside the 
13 jacket addressed to Shane. I questioned Ms. Olsen 
14 about whose jacket it was. She said that it was 
15 Shane Doyle's. 
: 6| Q. Now, is the person you're identifying as 
171 Shane Doyle, is he present here in the courtroom? 
18 A. Yes, he is. 
19J Q. Where is he? 
20 A. He's at the defendant's table. 
2l| Q. To your knowledge was there any other 
22 property removed from the vehicle, particularly the 
23 passenger's side? 
24 A. Yes, there was. 
25 Q. Who was driving the vehicle? 
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lj A. Ms. Olsen, Teri Olsen. 
2| Q. On the passenger's side what else did you 
locate? 
A. There was a package of cigarettes or a 
cigarette pack itself. I don't recall if there was 
actually cigarettes in it. There was a marijuana 
pipe found inside it. 
Q. Any marijuana inside the bag? 
A. I don't recall if there was any marijuana 
in there. 
MR. MADSEN: That's all the questions, your 
Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JEWELL: 
Q. Officer Johnston, who went with you to 
execute the warrant? 
A. There was my myself, Sergeant Jerry 
Harper, Officer Russ Billings, Officer Devon 
Jensen, Shawn Adamson. There was two uniforms from 
Provo City who I don't recall their names. 
Q. Now, did this group of people that you 
just named, did you all go over together to execute 
the warrant? 
A. Yes, we did. 
Q. How was this accomplished? Did someone 
• J ^ -J 86 
y 
1| knock on the door? How did you give notice that a 
2\ warrant was to be executed? 
3 A. We pulled up in a van. We were all 
4 loaded in a van and pulled up to the front door. 
5 Detective Shawn Adamson and Detective Andre Leavitt 
6 -- who I just recall was with us also -- went to 
7 the door, knocked on the door. 
8 Once the door was opened they gave us a 
9 visual signai. At that time we opened the door to 
10 the van and rushed in and did the cursory search 
13 and secured the trailer house. 
12 Q. Okay. Now, at what time did the van pull 
13 up to the house? 
14 A. I don't recall the exact time. 
15 THE COURT: After you arrived? 
16 THE FITNESS: Pardon me? 
17J THE COURT: After you arrived? 
18| THE WITNESS: The van? 
2S>| KP. JEWELL: Oh, I'm sorry. No, I'm 
20 talking about the van the officers were in 
21 (inaudible). 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 Q. BY MR. JEWELL: What time did you guys, you 
24 the officers pull up to the house? 
25 A. I don't recall the times. It was 
87 
1 approximately 1700, 5 o'clock in the evening. 
2 Q. Okay, and when you rushed into the house 
3 -- after you'd been given the signal and you rushed 
4 into the house, who was present inside the house? 
51 A. It was Steve Hundley and his wife Angie 
6 Hundley, 
7 Q. Was there anyone else present besides 
8 Mr. and Mrs- Hundley? 
91 A. I believe there was a small child there. 
10 Q. No other adults present; is that right? 
11 A. No, there was no other adults present at 
12 that time. 
13 Q. At that time did you begin searching the 
14 home? 
15| A. My primary responsibility once the trailer 
16l Wc:s secured was to videotape the suspects that we 
17j were going to arrest and videotape any evidence. 
18| As far as searching, I didn't participate in any of 
?.9 the searching of the trailer. 
20 Q. Was the warrant itself actually handed to 
21 one of the two adult Hundleys at that time? 
22 A. I don't recall who had the warrant in 
23 hand. I believe Sergeant Jerry Harper was the 
24 affiant. He was responsible to actually physically 
25 take the warrant inside the house and give it to 
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1 the occupants. I didn't do it. 
2 THE COURT: Is that something you taped? 
3 THE WITNESS: Pardon me? 
4 THE COURT: Is that something you videoed? 
5 THE WITNESS: No, it was not. 
6 Q. BY MR. JEWELL: Now, after you entered into 
7 the home after being given the visual signal, how 
8 much time elapsed between that and when the 
9 automobile driven by Ms. Olsen arrived? 
10 A. It was probably an hour, an hour and 15 
11 minutes. We were almost concluded with the search 
12 of the trailer when Mr. Doyle and Ms. Olsen 
13} arrived. 
14| Q. So you believe an hour, an hour and 15 
15 minutes would be about how much time elapsed 
16j between your entry into the trailer and when the 
I 
17! car with Ms. Olsen and Mr. Doyle arrived; is that 
18! correct? 
19! A. Yes. 
20 Q. Okay. Do you have a copy of your report 
21 in front of you? 
22 A. Yes, I do. 
23 Q. Okay. Now, at the time when you wrote 
24 this report how much time after you went on this 
25 search warrant did you write up this report? 
••JwO 8 9 
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1 A. It was probably the next day. 
2 Q. So would you term what you wrote on the 
3| 14th fairly accurate, pretty close in time? 
4| A* Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay. I'd like to draw your attention to 
paragraph two of that report, the first sentence. 
No, third paragraph, I'm sorry. The first 
sentence. Could you read that for us, please. 
A. At the completion of the search warrant 
two other individuals arrived at the home. A Shane 
Doyle and a Teri Olsen arrived. 
Q. Would you say that's accurate? 
A. Well, as I stated before, we were almost 
completed with the warrant. We were getting the 
evidence packed up and getting ready to leave. 
Making arrangements for having someone to pick up 
the child because we were taking Mr. and Mrs. 
Hundley into custody. 
Q. Had they already been arrested and removed 
from the home at that point? 
A. Okay. I don't recall if they had been 
transported yet or not. They had been placed under 
arrest at that time -- by that time, yes. 
Q. But you're not sure whether or not they 
had actually been removed from the home at this 
• J sS J 90 
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point, right? 
A. Right. I don't know if the uniforms had 
taken them and transported them or not. 
Q. Did you videotape the arrival of this 
automobile driven by Ms. Olsen? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you at any point videotape either 
Ms. Olsen or Mr. Doyle? 
A. I don't believe I did. I don't believe 
so. 
Q. Had you already put away the video camera 
by that point? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had any of the officers left the scene by 
the time that Mr. Doyle and Ms. Olsen arrived? 
A. No, not that I know of. I don't recall 
any. We had two vehicles. There was Serjeant 
Blackhurst's Blazer and e van. Those officers that 
came in the van were all still there. I don't 
recall if Sergeant Blackhurst had left by then or 
not. 
Q. Had any of the evidence been removed from 
the scene at the time they arrived? 
A. No, it hadn't. No, it had not. 
Q. And as far as the child, had the child 
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1 been removed at that point? 
2| A. No, it had not. 
Q* Okay, Could I have you come up here, if 
you wouldn't mind, to the board and just diagram 
the trailer, where your van was parked and where 
the automobile arrived. 
THE COURT: You can tell us what you're 
drawing as you're doing it. 
THE WITNESS: Okay. This is inside the 
Lamplighter -- I believe it's called the Lamp -- or 
commonly known as the Lamplighter Trailer Park. I 
don't know the exact street designations for these 
two streets. 
The Lamplighter, itself, that trailer park 
is the address 255 North 1600 West. It's just 
trailer No. 121. It sits on the east/west type 
access. This road, I believe, comes down into a 
cuidesac with additional trailers sitting on it. 
We came in here. Sergeant Blackhurst 
parked his Blazer here. We drove the van around 
here and stopped and waited. Detective Le^vitt, 
Detective Adamson was the passenger and the driver 
of the vehicle. The rest of us were in the back of 
the van. 
Ms. Olsen and Mr. Doyle pulled up in a 
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white Ford Escort parked in front of this other 
trailer right here. So they were parked to the 
south of the van. 
Q. BY MR. JEWELL: Okay. Could you indicate 
which entrance was used by the officers who went in 
to knock on the door. 
A. This entrance here. This entrance here 
was kind of a -- I don't recall if it was bolted or 
locked shut. It wasn't a functional entrance. 
Q. So that entrance you've just indicated, 
that one that would be on the south end of the 
trailer, that was the entrance used by all 
officers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, as far as any fencing or markings, is 
there any fencing around that particular trailer to 
indicate that this is the property owned by that 
trailer? 
A. I don't recall if there was a fence here. 
I know there's not a fence here. On the south side 
of 121 there's not a fence (inaudible). 
Q. Now, as far as the -- you've marked the 
Escort as being directly in front of the trailer, 
just to the south of the Hundley residence. 
A. That's what I said, yes. Right. j 
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l| Q. And which way was it facing? 
2| A, It was facing south, like that. Our 
vehicle was also facing south. 
Q. Are there markings on the curbs for which 
trailer is which, or are the markings actually on 
the trailers themselves? 
A. The markings are on the trailers 
themselves. There are no markings on the road 
surface to designate an address or anything like 
that. It's just a -- you know, it's a smooth road, 
is all that is there. 
Q. Now, as far as mailboxes, are the 
mailboxes on the trailers or are they in front of 
the trailers? 
A. I don't recall where the mailboxes are at, 
or even if -- T don't know if this trailer has a 
common area for mail to walk down co, or whether 
the mail is delivered directly to the trailers 
themselves. 
Q. Now, what about the actual parking for the 
owners or tenants of the trailer? Do they park 
next to the trailer or do they have to park up the 
street also? 
A. They can park in -- there's a pad between 
each of the trailers where the occupants or the 
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1 tenants can park their vehicles. 
2 Q. So the pad for the Hundley trailer would 
3 be just south? 
4 A. Yeah, it's right here, I guess it would 
5 be to the south, 
6 Q. The southeast of the trailer? 
7 A, Southeast. 
8 Q. Okay, and then just south of that would be 
9 the neighbor's trailer? 
10| A. Yes, this is another trailer here, 
i 
11 Q. And that would be -- was chat No. 122? 
12 A. I don't recall what it is. Whether it was 
13 122 or -- trailer parks have a tendency to have 
14 their own pattern when they set it up. 
15 Q. And then the pad for the neighbor's 
16j trailer is just the south of that trailer also? 
17 A. Yeah; this pad would go to this trailer.. 
18 this pad would go to this trailer. It was very 
19i limited space .'inaudible) between the trailer and 
20 the curb on the north side. 
2 li Q. How much space between the trailer and the 
22 curb on the east side? 
23 A. Eight to ten feet. 
24 Q. Now, that street that's in front, is that 
25 a common area street? 
xy
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1| A. This right here? 
21 Q. Uh-huh. 
3 A. Yeah, it's an access street because you 
4 have trailers back here. 
5 Q. And how many trailers would you estimate 
6 are in that area? 
7 A. One, two, three, four, five, six. There 
8 would probably be seven trailers in this including 
9| (inaudible) . 
10 Q. And were there street lights over that 
11 area? Was it in the day or night? I'm sorry. 
12 A. We entered during the daylight hours. We 
13 (inaudible) when it was dark. I recall there was a 
14 street light over here, and I recall that there 
15 possibly was a street light down here at the end of 
16 the culdesac that was lit when we ieft. This area 
17 by the trailer itself was quite dark. 
18 Q. Were there other cars parked along the 
19 street at that time that the Doyle pulled up? 
20| A. I recall another car sitting in front of 
21 the Ford Escort. There was another vehicle or 
22 something there, a trailer of some sort parked in 
23 the street. 
24 Q. And that was parked -- was that there when 
25 the Escort pulled up? The Escort pulled up behind 
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1 that; is that what you're saying? 
2 A. No. What I'm saying is it was there when 
3 I came out and searched the vehicle. 
4 Q. Is that right? 
5 A. There was another vehicle or a trailer. 
6 There was something there in front of the Escort. 
7 Q. Was that vehicle searched? 
8 A. No, it was not. 
9 Q. Do you know who the owner of that vehicle 
10 was? 
11 A. I do not. 
12 MR. JEWELL: I don't believe I have any 
13 further questions, your Honor. 
14 MR. MADSEN: No more questions, your Honor. 
15 The State calls Devon Jensen. 
16 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
17 the testimony you are about to give in the case now 
18 pending before this Court will be the truth, the 
19 whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
20 God? 
21 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
2 2 DEVON JENSEN. 
23 having been first duly sworn, 
24 testified as follows: 
2 5 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
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1 BY MR, MADSEN: 
2 Q, Would you please state your full name and 
3 occupation. 
4 A. Devon Jensen. I'm a police officer for 
5 Provo City. 
6 Q. Now, did you participate in the search of 
7 the Hundley's trailer on the 11th day of November 
8 of this year? 
9 A. Yes, I did. 
10 Q. Pursuant to that were you there when a 
11 vehicle arrived operated by Ms. Olsen in which 
12 Mr. Shane Doyle was a passenger? 
13 A. Yes, I was. 
14 Q. When did you first see Ms. Olsen and 
15 Mr. Doyle? 
16 A. When they came to the door while we were 
17 executing a search warrant inside. 
18 Q. Subsequent to that contact did you have 
19 occasion to examine the contents of the jacket that 
20 was described as Mr. Doyle's? 
21 A. No, I did not. 
22 Q. Did you ever examine any of the items that 
23 were removed from it? 
24 A. No. 
25 Q. Do you remember seeing a cassette case 
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1 either in the vehicle or outside the trailer? 
2 A. Yes, I found a cassette case on the 
3 passenger floor of the vehicle. 
4 Q. Do you know who put it there? 
5 A. No, I don't. 
6 Q. Did you examine the cassette case? 
7 A. Yes, I did. 
8 Q. Did you examine the contents? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. What was inside? 
11 A. Three plastic bags which contained 
12 methamphetamine• 
13 Q. Were they field tested? 
14 A. Yes, they were. 
15 Q. Tested positive? 
16l A. Yes, they were. 
17 MR. MADSEN: 1 have no other questions, 
181 your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Would you describe the location 
20 of the cassette case as you found it. 
21 THE WITNESS: It was on the passenger floor 
221 of the vehicle. It was a Ford Escort. 
23 THE COURT: You looked there after this 
24 vehicle had been entered by others or were you 
25 looking? 
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1 THE WITNESS: Detective Johnston and 
2 Adamson had already been looking through the 
3 vehicle when I went and looked and found the 
4 cassette. 
51 THE COURT: Had they discontinued their 
6 search when you began yours? 
7 THE WITNESS: I believe they were still 
8 searching and interviewing the female at the time 
9 when I went out and assisted them in searching the 
10 vehicle. 
11 THE COURT: What does "on the floor" mean? 
12 Under something or --
13| THE WITNESS: No, it was just in front of 
14 the seat on the floor. 
15 THE COURT: Front and center in plain 
161 view? 
17 TKE WITNESS: In the passenger plain view. 
13 THE COURT: Go ah*2ac'. 
19J CROSS EXAMINATION 
20 BY MR. JEWELL: 
2 X| Q. Now, Officer Jensen, you indicated you 
22 were not the first person to search the vehicle. 
23 A. No, I was not. 
24 Q. And who were the two officers that you 
25 mentioned that had searched the vehicle before you 
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1 had? 
2 A. Detective Johnston and Adamson had already 
3 found some items of controlled substance and 
4 paraphernalia and so forth in the vehicle. 
5 Q. But it was you who located this cassette 
6 that you've described? 
7 A. Yes, 
8 Q. And this type of vehicle, is there a bench 
9 seat or are they bucket seats? 
10 A. They are bucket seats. 
11 Q. Two-door or four-door? 
12 A. I don't recall. I believe it was two-door 
13 with a hatchback. 
14 Q. And when you entered the vehicle to search 
15 through it, which door of the vehicle did you 
16 enter? 
17 A. The driver's. 
18| Q. And from that perspective of the driver's 
19 side did you notice the cassette on the floor? 
20 A. Yes, I was kneeling on the front driver's 
2 1 seat looking under the seats and around, when I 
22 picked up the cassette and found the baggies 
23 inside. 
24 Q. Now, this cassette was described on the 
25 floor. Was it underneath the floor mat or was it 
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1 in plain view? 
2| A. It was in plain view, 
Q. And what was the cover of the cassette --
excuse me. If the cassette cover were not open, 
what would it read on the outside? Was it a music 
group or something like that? 
A. No, it wasn't a music group. It was a --
I don't recall the brand name, but it had the 
regular package cf a cassette, the paper on the 
outside, so you couldn't view the contents inside^ 
It wasn't clear. It had a paper lining in it. 
Once I opened that, there wasn't a cassette in it 
and I found the three baggies of meth in them. 
Q. So what you're saying is like it was a 
type of cassette, Sony or whatever? 
A, Yeah, something like that. 
i 
THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand. Was » 
it an actual cass« 11a,? 
1HE WITNESS: It was a cassette case. 
THE COURT: It was a case, not a cassette. 
THE WITNESS: That's correct. 
Q. BY MR. JEWELL: Now, in finding this item, 
you opened it. Then after that point you found 
something inside? 
A. Yes. 
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1 Q. And what did you remove from inside that 
2 container? 
3 A. There were three baggies which contained a 
4 powdered substance that field tested positive for 
5 methamphetamines. 
6 Q. Did you yourself conduct that field test? 
7 A, No, I did not. 
8 Q. Who did conduct that field test? 
9 A. Officer Billings. 
10 Q. Did you ever fingerprint the cassette 
11 casing that you've described? 
12 A. No, I did not. 
13 Q. Was anything found on Mr. Doyle which 
14 indicated that he had any kind ownership of that 
15 cassette? Maybe another cassette with the same 
16: brand name on it or anything? 
17 A. Not to my knowledge. I didn't have any 
18l contact with Mr. Doyle in searching him. 
19 Q. Did you question Mr. Doyle at all? 
20 A. No, I did not. 
21 Q. Did you videotape anything at the scene? 
22 A. No, I did not. 
23 MR. JEWELL: I don't have any further 
24 questions for this witness. 
25 MR. MADSEN: Nothing further, your Honor. 
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1 I might briefly recall Detective Johnston, 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 (Denton Johnston retakes the witness stand) 
4 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. MADSEN: 
6 Q. I remind you, Detective Johnston, you're 
7 still under oath. You testified earlier about 
8 finding a cassette case inside the coat; is that 
9 correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. What did you do with it? 
12 A. Set it on the floor of the vehicle. Set 
13 it on the floorboards of the car. 
14 Q. Did you see the cassette case after the 
15 raeth was removed from it? 
16 A. Yes, I did. 
17 0. Was that the same one you removed? 
18j A. It wss the same one. 
19| MR. MADSEN: I have no more questions. 
20 THE COURT: I didn't follow that. You 
21 discovered it first? 
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, it was in the 
23 jacket pocket with the rest of the paraphernalia, 
24 but I overlooked it as paraphernalia. Did not look 
25 inside, open the case up and look inside. I set 
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1 it down on the floorboard, went back to looking 
2 through the jacket. 
3 THE COURT: Did you find the jacket in the 
41 car? 
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, I did. 
6 THE COURT: Where? 
7 THE WITNESS: It was in between the two 
8 seats. 
9 THE COURT: Between bucket seats? 
10 THE WITNESS: Between the bucket seats on 
111 the console. 
12 THE COURT: You searched the jacket? 
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir I did. 
14 THE COURT: Removed the case from the 
15 jacket? 
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
I7j THE COURT: Set it ot: the floor in about 
18 the area where — I'm sorry — 
19 THE WITNESS: Officer Jensen. 
20 THE COURT: -- Officer Jensen said he found 
21 it? 
22 THE WITNESS: I recall setting it on the 
23 driver's side floorboards. 
24 THE COURT: You don't remember putting it 
25 on the passenger's. 
105 
28 
1 THE WITNESS: No, sir. I recall I was 
2 kneeling on the driver's seat searching the jacket 
3 that I had found and setting it on the floorboards 
4 of the driver's side. 
5 THE COURT: So if somebody moved it over 
6 there, somebody else did that? 
7 THE WITNESS: I don't know, sir. Officer 
8 Jensen came out to assist. I took the jacket 
9 outside of the -/chicle to finish searching. 
1C THE COURT: But you think you put it on the 
11 driver's side because that's where you were? 
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
13 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
14 RSCROSS SXAtttflATtoy 
151 BY MR. JEWELL: 
16 Q. Officer Johnston, did ycu do any weighing 
17 of these items v/hich were (inaudible) by Officer 
I8j Jensen? 
19 A. No, I did not. 
20 Q* Did anybody else do any weighing of these 
21 items? 
22 A. That evidence, I did not handle that 
23 evidence, as far as the controlled substance that 
24 we found. 
25 Q. Did you ever question Mr. Doyle? 
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1 A. I did not. 
2 Q. I think before you previously testified 
3 you never videotaped any of this. 
4 A. No, I didn't. 
5 MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions. 
6 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. MADSEN: 
8 Q. How long have you been a narcotics 
9 officer? 
10 A. About a year and a half. 
11 Q. Do you have experience with both sales and 
12 possession of individuals that have been charged 
131 with both? 
14 A. Yes, sir. 
15 Q. Do you have an opinion --
16 MR. JEWELL: Objection, your Honor. I 
17 don't think this witness has the proper background 
18 to define — 
19 MR. MADSEN: Perhaps if he'd let me ask the 
20 foundational questions before he interrupts about 
21 objecting to foundation. 
22 THE COURT: I don't know what he's going to 
23 ask yet. 
24 Q. BY MR. MADSEN: Do you have a professional 
25 opinion based on your experience with regard to 
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1 possession and distribution as to whether three 
2 bags would indicate possession with intent to use 
3 or possession with intent to distribute? 
4 MR. JEWELL: Well, I don't think that's 
5 foundation, your Honor. I don't think he should be 
6 entitled to give a (inaudible) opinion on this 
7 issue. I don't think it's been established that he 
8 had an extensive narcotics background to determine 
9 what's intent and what's not intent as far as 
10 amount of possession. 
11 THE COURT: J don't think the answer could 
12 help me. I think I would weigh it so little I 
13 don't think it could help me. I doo't think it 
14J matters. 
15 MR. MADSEN: I have no further questions. 
16 THE COURT: I don't know that it's 
17 inadmissible, but I just wouldn't be interested in 
18 the answer, I don't think. 
19 MR. MADSEN: State ce-ils Ofiicer Shawn 
20 Adamson. 
2 1 THE COURT: Thanks. 
22 COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that 
23 the testimony you're about to give in the case now 
24 pending before this Court will be the truth, the 
25 whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you 
3 1 
1 God? 
2 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
3 SHAWN ADAMSON, 
4 having been first duly sworn, 
5 t e s t i f i e d as f o l l o w s : 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 BY MR. MADSEN: 
8 Q. Would you please state your full name and 
9 occupation. 
10 A. Shawn Adamson. I'm a deputy with the Utah 
11 County Sheriffs Department, 
12 Q. Did you participate in a search on the 
13 11th of November at the Hundley trailer? 
14 A. Yes, I did. 
15 Q. Were you present when Shane Doyle and 
16 M s . O l s e n a r r i v e d at t h a t t r a i l e r ? 
17 A. Yes, I was. 
18 Q. Did you participate in the search of 
19 Mr. Doyle's vehicle? 
20 A. I did. 
21 Q. Did you in fact interrogate Mr. Doyle 
22 after his arrest or after the search? 
23 A. Yes, I did. 
24 Q. Had he been Mirandized? 
2 5 A. He was. 
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1 Q. Did he make election to make any 
2 statements to you? 
3 A, He indicated to me that he understood his 
4 rights and agreed to speak with me. 
5 Q. Did you asked him regarding the ownership 
6 of the items of paraphernalia and the bags of 
7 methamphetaraine that had been removed from the car? 
8 A. I did. 
9 Q. What did he say to you? 
10 A. He said that they were his and that the 
11 lady that was in the car when they arrived had 
12 nothing to do with it. 
13 MR. MADSEN: I have no further questions, 
14 your Honor. 
15 cposs EXAmNATioy 
1 6 BY MR. JEWELL: 
17 Q. Officer Adamson, you testified you were 
18 present when Mr. Doyle arrived; is that correct? 
19 A. That's correct. 
20 Q. And how did he arrive? 
21 A. They arrived in a white compact car, a 
22 small car, and came to the front door of the 
23 trailer. 
24 Q. And Mr. Doyle was not the driver? 
25 A. That's correct. 
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1| Q. Now, over here on the board we have a 
21 diagram that's been done by Officer Johnston. I 
3 just w a n t you to t a k e a g l a n c e at t h i s . M a y b e you 
4 can g e t s i t u a t e d w i t h t h i s d i a g r a m . T h i s is n o r t h . 
5 A. Yeah, I recognize it. 
6 Q. T h i s is N o . 1 2 1 . F i n e . W o u l d it be fair 
7 to say that this van parked in front of the trailer 
8 is -- this car, excuse me, parked in front of the 
9 trailer, would that accurately represent the van 
10 t h a t y o u a r r i v e d in? 
11 A. That's correct. 
12 Q. And would it be fair to say that this car 
13 here with the little triangle in it parked in 
14 front of the other trailer would be the car that 
15 Mr. Doyle arrived in; would that be accurate? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. So those locations are fairly accurate? 
18 A. It appears to be accurate to me, yes. 
19 Q . And t h e n t h i s w o u l d be -•- t h i s a r e a r i g h t 
2 0 here just south of the trailer before you reach the 
2 1 next trailer would be a parking pad; would that be 
22 accurate? 
23 A. I b e l i e v e t h a t ' s w h a t it i s . I c a n ' t 
24 recall whether or not it was occupied by a vehicle 
25 at that time. 
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1 Q. Now, at the time the warrant was executed, 
2 what was your duties as far as the actual search? 
3 Were you to go in and search? Were you questioned? 
4 What was your duty at the time the warrant was 
5 actually executed on the house? 
6 A. I was assigned as the initial approach 
7 officer -- or one of the initial approach officers. 
8 Two of us walked to the front door and knocked on 
9 the door. 
10 Q. That would be you and Officer Leavitt? 
11 A. That's correct, 
12 Q. And at the time that you knocked on the 
13 front door, someone answered? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Who was that? 
16 A. Mr. Hundley. 
17 Q. Did you tell Mr. Hundley the purpose of 
18 your visit? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Did you hand him the search warrant? 
21 A. It was provided to him, yes. It wasn't 
22 done immediately or right at that point. 
23 Q. Oh, at what point was it handed to him? 
24 A. I didn't see it given to him. 
25 Q. Who would have been involved with that? 
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1 A. The case officer, which in this case would 
2 have been Devon Jensen, I believe. 
3 Q. Now, at the time that you stated the 
4 purpose of your visit to Mr. Hundley, did you 
5 request the services of other officers? 
61 A. There were other officers present and 
7 waiting for us to get through the front door. 
81 Q. And did you eventually (inaudible)? 
9 A. Yes, they came in of their own accord. 
3 0 Q. And you conducted a search at that time? 
Ill A. We did. 
12 Q. Who was present when you began conducting 
13 that search? 
14 A. From memory I didn't list the officers in 
15 my report. 
16 Q. I'm sorry, I meant the people at the home, 
17 not the officers. 
18 A. Oh, the suspects? There was Mr. Hundley 
19 and Mrs. Hundley. 
20 Q. Was there anyone else in the home? 
21 A. A s m a l l c h i l d . 
22 Q. But as far as the adults it was only 
23 Mr. and Mrs. Hundley? 
24 A. That's correct. 
25 Q. And then the search was begun? 
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1| A. Yes. 
2| Q. Now, were Mr. and Mrs. Hundley eventually 
3| placed under arrest? 
41 A. They were. 
Q. And who was responsible for doing that? 
A. I believe again Devon Jensen. Well, 
possibly Andre Leavitt, as well. He made the 
initial contact with Mr. Hundley. I don't know who 
placed them under arrest. 
Q. Were they -- do you recall if they were 
placed under arrest prior to the arrival of 
Mr. Doyle in this white vehicle that you've 
described earlier? 
A. I believe that they were. 
Q. Were they actually transported and pulled 
out of the house before Mr. Doyle arrived? 
A. 1 think that they were. 
Q. What about the small child? 
A. The child, someone had come to take that 
child. 
Q. And that was before Mr. Doyle arrived in 
this car? 
A. I believe it was. 
Q. How much time elapsed between when you 
knocked on the door to state the purpose of your 
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1 visit and when Mr. Doyle arrived in this white 
2 vehicle? 
3 A. I couldn't say exactly, but somewhere 
4 around 40 minutes. Between 40 minutes and an hour. 
5 Q. Okay. Now, you've testified you had an 
6 opportunity to question Mr. Doyle; is that correct? 
7 A. That's correct. 
8 Q. And where did this questioning take place? 
9 A. In the living room at the trailer. 
10 Q. Had you told Mr. Doyle he was under arrest 
11 at that point? 
12 A. He was under arrest at that point. 
13 Q. Had you told him that? 
14 A. He was in handcuffs, as I recall. 
15 Q. And who had placed him in handcuffs? 
16 A. I had. 
17 Q. And at what point did you place him in 
13 handcuffs? When he arrived at the door or 
19 ( inaudible)? 
20 A. After we had found the items of 
2 1i paraphernalia that tested positive for 
22 methamphetamine in his pocket. 
23 Q. So between when he arrived at the door and 
24 when you put the handcuffs on him, did you say, 
25 "You need to stay here. We're going to search your 
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1 car." or what happened? 
2| A. He was placed under arrest and maintained 
3| in custody there at the living room of the trailer. 
Q. Until the search could be done to the car? 
A. No. He was awaiting transport. 
Q. I'm sorry, I want you to give me the 
chronological order of things. 
A. Right. He came in the door. 
Q, Okay, he comes in the door. 
A. I searched him. 
Q. You searched him. 
A. I found paraphernalia. 
Q. Ycu found paraphernalia. 
A. It was tested. Found to be -- to test 
positive for methamphetamine. 
Q. And at that point you --
A* He was placed under arrest. 
Q. And then after that the car was searched? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And you've testified that this interview 
took place in the living room; is that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And were there any other officers present 
when this interview took place? 
A. Oh, yes, there were several around. 
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1 Q. Were there any with you listening to the 
2 interview? 
3 A, No, not participating specifically with 
4 the interview, no. 
5 Q, Was there a recording either video or 
6 audio made of this interview? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. You indicated that that's when you believe 
9 you read him his Miranda rights. 
10 A. I did advise him of his rights as per 
11 Miranda. 
12 Q. And you've testified that he indicated he 
13 understood.those rights. 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And he agreed to talk with you? 
16 A. He did. 
17 Q. hn6 when he agreed to talk to you you 
181 stated that he indicated tnat the items found 
19 within the coat in the car were his; is that 
20 correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. How was it that -- did you ask him 
23 specifically? Did you show him the items and say, 
24 "Is this yours?" or how was it you asked him about 
25 the items? 
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1 A. No, I told him that we had found three 
2 bindles of methamphetamine and a butane torch and 
3| some other items of paraphernalia. Specifically 
there was a pipe that was found in a cigarette 
package that was on the dash. 
All of the other items of drugs and 
paraphernalia were found in the leather coat that 
was in the car. I described these things to him 
and asked him if they were his. 
Q. And after so doing what was his indication 
to you, if any? 
A. He said that they were his. That they 
were planning on going with the Hundleys to 
Salt Lake. They were going to go up to a club 
there, and that he was taking his meth up there for 
that purpose. 
MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions of 
this officer, your Honor. 
MR. MADSEN: Nothing further, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. MADSEN: The State rests. 
THE COURT: Will we hear from anyone else? 
MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Are you going to present any 
evidence? 
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1 MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Do you want argument? 
3 MR. MADSEN: Just briefly, your Honor. I 
4 think that the possession of metharaphetamine in a 
5 drug-free zone with intent to distribute would be a 
6 question of fact for the jury. 
7 As to quantity, as to intent to distribute 
8 or intent to use, I think the only evidence before 
9 the Court is the three bindles, separately packaged 
10 bindles that were located, and that this defendant 
11 acknowledged notice of. 
12 We have not introduced evidence to carry 
13 the Count II, possession of marijuana. However, 
14 Count III, possession of paraphernalia, they've 
15 testified (inaudible) that this defendant 
16 (inaudible). 
17 THE COURT: Do you want to be heard? 
18 MR. JEWELL: Yes, your Honor, just briefly. 
19 I do not believe that the State has shown there was 
20 an intent to distribute. I also believed the State 
21 failed to show that this occurred in a drug-free 
22 zone. I think at a minimum they have to show what 
23 there is that constitutes a drug-free zone. 
24 THE COURT: Any direct evidence on that? I 
25 don't know if I've heard it either. 
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1 MR. MADSEN: I don't remember. 
2 THE COURT: I don't think so. 
3 MR. MADSEN: I do know what the testimony 
4 is. I'd like to petition to reopen, if the Court 
5 (inaudible). 
6 THE COURT: We'll allow that if it's at 
7 issue. 
81 MR. JEWELL: If the Court's inclined to do 
9 that I would just as soon know specifically what 
10 they're trying to allege the drug-free zone is. 
11 MR. MADSEN: I'd like to recall Officer 
12 Denton Johnston. 
13 THE COURT: Do you believe there was prior 
14 testimony? 
15 MR. MADSEN: I didn't --
16 THE COURT: I don't remember it. I was 
17 just about to ask you if you'd presented anything 
18; on that, if Counsel didn't bring it up, because if 
19 you did I didn't remember. 
20 MR. MADSEN: Well, he's the one that told 
21 me, your Honor. It involved the description of the 
22 park. 
23 (Officer Johnston retakes the witness stand) 
24 /// 
25 /// 
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l| REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
21 BY BY MR. MADSEN: 
3 Q. Inside the Lamplighter, Officer Johnston, 
4 reminding you that you're under oath, are there 
5 areas set aside designated as parks and play areas? 
61 A. Yes, there is. 
7 Q. Is there one in the vicinity of this 
8 trailer? 
9 A. The street that runs east and west, just 
10 north of trailer No. 121, if you was to go one 
11 street over, there was a -- near trailer No. 25 
12 there's a -- not necessarily a clubhouse, but a 
13 maintenance-type shack or a shed there. By that 
14 there is a fenced area in which gym apparatus, 
15 playground apparatus and such has been set up 
16j within the park itself. 
37 Q. Is that within a thousand feet of this 
18J trailer? 
19 A. Oh, definitely within a thousand feet. I 
20 would say it's within 150 feet of that trailer. 
2 1 MR. MADSEN: I have no other questions, 
22 your Honor. 
2 3 CROSS EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. JEWELL: 
25 Q. Officer, so is this area that you've 
121 
1 described, is it included within the trailer park 
2 itself? 
3 A, Yes, it sits in the middle. The trailer 
4 park encircles that area. 
5 Q. Okay, and what exactly -- you've described 
6 just gym apparatus. Just briefly tell us what 
7 there is there, if you recall. 
8 A. I believe there's a swing set, a small 
9 slide, the older type jungle gyms you would find on 
10 elementary school playgrounds. Just the maze and 
11 bars that's there. It has a.four foot or so 
12 chain link fence around it. 
13 Q. And this is the area you believe is set 
14 aside for the owners of the trailer park to use? 
15| A. Yeah, the tenants of the trailer park for 
i 
16j their kids to play en or whatever. 
17, MR. JEWELL: I have no further questions of 
18 the officer. 
191 THE COURT: Anything? 
20 MR. MADSEN: No further questions. 
21j THE COURT: Thank you. Anybody want 
22 argument? 
23 MR. MADSEN: I believe, your Honor, that as 
24 far as that particular element is concerned, that's 
25 met by the designation of that area as a children's 
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1 playground in the presence of an enclosed area 
2 designated as that would provide adequate 
3 (inaudible) designated as a park and play area. 
4 THE COURT: Do you want argument? 
5 MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I think that's a 
6 stretch. I don't know if this is the point in 
7 which to address it, but it's not open to the 
8 public. I don't think it qualifies as a drug-free 
9 zone. 
10 THE COURT: I don't know either. I find 
11 that the evidence has to do with the children's 
12 playground is private in nature, not public in 
13 nature. For the use of the residents of the park. 
14 Isn't that what the showing would be? 
15 I'm going to find that that's probable 
16 cause. I think that's a specific finding on it. I 
17j frankly don't knew if that's within the meaning of 
181 the statute cr not. It enhances it. I think it's 
19 enough for probable cause. I bind over. The 
20 State's carried the burden of proof and I bind 
21 over. 
22 MR. JEWELL: On Counts I and III 
23 (inaudible). 
24 THE COURT: Yes. I don't know that they 
25 dismissed it, but they acknowledged that they 
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1 didn't make a showing on Counts I and III. Not the 
2 marijuana. Whichever the marijuana is, it is not 
3 bound over. 
41 COURT CLERK: January the 5th at 8 o'clock, 
5 Judge Park. 
6 THE COURT: For that day and hour. Thank 
7 you. We're in recess. 
81 (Hearing concluded) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were 
transcribed under my direction from the electronic 
tape recording made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true and 
correct and contains all of the evidence, all of 
the objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court 
and all matters to which the same relate which were 
audible through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested 
in the outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified 
in the record, and therefore the name associated 
with the statement may not be the correct name as 
to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 9th day of 
January 1995. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 1996 T* --' U^;/:'^ 
NGTA^y PUBLIC " ^ [ 
residing in Utah County 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
•+T< >-:.:-
.•J 
MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 941400879 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendant, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, submits the following memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Defendant's Motion to Suppress addressing admissibility 
of evidence potentially presented by the prosecution. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The NET had received tips that Steven Hundley was selling drugs. 
2. On November 7, 1994 the NET searched the trash can at 255 North 
1600 West #121 in Provo and allegedly located paraphernalia with 
residue, marijuana parts and correspondence to Steven Hundley and 
Angie Hundley. 
3. An Affidavit (with the heading "State of Utah Plaintiff, vs. 
Steven Hundley Angela Hundley 255 N. 1600 W. #121 Provo, UT 
Defendants") containing the aforementioned information was submitted 
C- J , 3S 
to Judge John Backlund. 
4. A Search Warrant was signed by Judge Backlund on November 9, 1994 
contained the heading "State of Utah Plaintiff, vs. Steven Hundley 
Angela Hundley 255 N. 1600 W. #121 Provo, UT Defendants." 
5. The Search Warrant contained the following statement: "Your are 
also hereby directed to search of any outbuildings, curtilage, 
vehicles, and the person of any individuals present at the time of the 
execution of this warrant." [sic] 
6. When the officers arrived to execute the Warrant at the Hundley 
residence there were three people present--Steven Hundley, Angie 
Hundley and a child. 
7. Approximately forty (40) minutes to an hour and fifteen (15) 
minutes after the police had started their search, Defendant arrived 
in a car which parked on the street (Defendant was not the driver)> 
8. When Defendant arrived at the door, an officer searched Defendant 
and allegedly found paraphernalia on him. 
9. Later, the car in which Defendant had arrived was searched and 
allegedly controlled substances were found in Defendant's coat. 
10. The Defendant is charged with the following: 
Possessing Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone with Intent to 
Distribute, a First Degree Felony 
Possessing or Using Marijuana in a Drug Free Zone, a Class A 
Misdemeanor 
Unlawfully Possessing Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a 
Class A Misdemeanor 
37 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE WARRANT IS OVERBROAD AND VIOLATES BOTH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. United 
States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution also provides this same 
protection for its citizens. 
The Affidavit in this matter names both Steven and Angela Hundley 
as does the Search Warrant. Defendant's name does not appear in 
either the Affidavit or the Search Warrant. If the State had believed 
it had probable cause as to Defendant, it should have provided that 
information in its Affidavit. Neither the Affidavit or the Warrant 
provide probable cause to conduct a search of Defendant. 
As the Utah Court of Appeals declared in State v. Jackson: "An 
individual's mere presence at a place named in a search warrant does 
not automatically subject the individual to a personal search." 873 
P.2d 1166, 1167 (Utah App. 1994). Similarly, in this matter 
Defendant's presence alone does not justify a search of his person. 
This comports with the U.S. Supreme Court opinion: 
Where the standard is probable cause a search or seizure of 
a person must be supported by probable cause particularized 
with respect to that person. This requirement cannot be 
undercut or avoided by simple pointing to the fact that 
coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or 
- ^ 36 
seize another or to search the premises where the person may 
happen to be. The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protect 
the "legitimate expectation of privacy" of persons, not 
places. 
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (emphasis added). In this 
matter there is no probable cause "supported by Oath or affirmation" 
particularized to the Defendant. 
The grant of authority in the Warrant is both overbroad and 
vague. The statement: "Your are also hereby directed to search of any 
outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any individuals 
present at the time of the execution of this warrant." [sic] fails to 
identify with particularity where the outbuildings, vehicles and 
persons are to be found. The Affidavit requests that the search 
warrant be issued for "the curtilage and the person of all individuals 
present within the home and curtilage, and all vehicles located at 
said residence at the time of search . . . " If the magistrate had 
intended that the items be found within the curtilage, he should have 
so stated in the Warrant. The wording in the Warrant is unclear and 
could conceivably allow the police to search cars in the street, 
buildings of the next door neighbors and persons on the sidewalk. 
If such blatant violations of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 14 were permissible ("Your are also hereby directed to search 
of any outbuildings, curtilage, vehicles, and the person of any 
individuals present at the time of the execution of this warrant." 
[sic]) anyone is subject to search--a newspaper boy, the UPS delivery 
person, the gardener, visitors from out-of-town, grandparents. Such 
broad grants of authority are unfounded and violate the Utah Supreme 
Court's declaration: 
If the warrant is to serve its function, then the 
circumstances under which an individual may be subjected to 
a warrantless search must be narrow. Banks is correct, for 
example, in his contention that a person's mere presence in 
the company of others whom the police have probable cause to 
search does not provide probable cause to search that person 
. . . Nor are police officers authorized to search an 
individual merely because that person is present on premises 
for which a search has been authorized, id., unless there is 
some independent probable cause to justify a search of the 
individual. 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1382-83 (Utah 1986). 
The Warrant's broad grant of authority to search without 
particularized probable cause is unsupported by "Oath or affirmation" 
and violates both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution ar.d any evidence obtained thereby should be 
suppressed. 
II. THE SEARCH OP DEPENDANT AND THE VEHICLE IN WHICH HE RODE WERE 
OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OP AUTHORITY GRANTED BY THE WARRANT. 
The Warrant issued in this matter allowed certain items to be 
searched "at the time of the execution of this warrant." According to" 
testimony given at the preliminary hearing, Defendant arrived at the 
residence anywhere from forty (40) minutes to an hour and fifteen (15) 
minutes after the police had started their search. ("It was probably 
an hour, an hour and 15 minutes." [Denton Johnson] Transcript p. 11 
lines 10-11. "Between 40 minutes and an hour." [Shawn Adamson] 
Transcript p. 37 lines 3-4.) According to Officer Denton Johnson's 
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suppressed. 
IV. AS THE SEARCH OF DEPENDANT AND THE VEHICLE IN WHICH HE RODE WAS 
IMPERMISSIBLE, ANY AND ALL STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT SHOULD BE 
SUPPRESSED AS FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE. 
As the warrant is overbroad and the searches of Defendant and the 
car in which he rode were outside the scope of the warrant, the 
searches violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. The evidence found as a result of the 
impermissible searches, including any statements made by Defendant, 
must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree because the evidence 
was obtained as a result of an illegal search. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), State v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 690 (Utah 
1990) . 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant respectfully moves the 
court to suppress the evidence in this matter, including any 
statements made to the police by Defendant. 
ADDENDUM: 
Affidavit in Support of a Search Warrant 
Search Warrant 
DATED this [U\ day of January, 1 
Michael E. Jewell 
Attorney fp*^ Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OP MAILING 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy 
the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center, 
Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ftf de*Y-?of Jap^r^^9^3, 
ADDENDUM 5 
Transcript of Suppression Hearing 
1 
I N THE-FOUHTH J U D I C I A L D I S T R I C T COURT 
4- ' l O t ^ S r r C#UNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF f
*S ; 3 f l 1 ' 9 5 
P l a i n t i f f , 
vs . 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Original 
Case No. 941400879 
Defendant 
Suppression Hearing 
Electronically recorded on 
January 3 l, 1995 
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE BOYD L. PARK 
Fourth Circuit Court Judge 
APPEAfiANQS?; 
For the State: 
For the Defendant 
Craia Madsen 
Deputy County Attorney 
100 East Center Street 
Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
Telephone: (801)370-8026 
Michael Jewell 
Utah County Public Defender 
40 South 100 West 
Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801)379-25 7 0 
Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe RPR/CSR/CCT 
CENTER COURT REPORTING 
P. 0. BOX 1786 
PROVO, UTAH 84603-1786 
T E L E P H O N E | — 1 8 | 0 i r r 2 f P S 9 8 4 7 FltEP 
JUN 2 9 1995 
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2 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on January 31, 1995) 
3 THE COURT: State of Utah versus Shane 
4 Doyle. Are you ready, Mr. Jewell? 
5 MR. JEWELL: We are, your Honor. As a 
6 preliminary matter we'd like to have the Court make 
7 two corrections on the memorandum which was filed 
8 in this matter. On page 6 of that memorandum, that 
9 first paragraph in the middle of the page --
10 THE COURT: Is the merooradura numbered? 
llj MR. JEWELL: No, it's not, unfortunately. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 MR. JEWELL: The paragraph that kind of 
14 starts in the middle of the page there. 
15 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
16l MR. JKWELL: Okay. I cite to the Utah 
17 Constitution. It should read Article 1, Section 
18 14. It's typed as Article 1, Section 12. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. JEWELL: And then on the next page, 
21 page 7, in the bold lettering up at the top once 
22 again, where it says, "Article 1, Section 12 of the 
23 Utah Constitution,M it should read Article 1, 
24 Section 14 . 
25 THE COURT: Got it. Mr. Madsen, are you 
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ready? 
MR. MADSEN: We are, your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. Are you going 
forward or do you want --
MR. MADSEN: (Inaudible) partly, your 
Honor. I'm here to respond. The presumption is 
that the magistrate did not error. That the 
magistrate issued a valid search warrant. The 
search warrant was validly executed. It's there 
burden to prove otherwise, so I'll let them go 
Hi forward. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, I believe that 
we've raised all the issues in our memorandum. The 
State hasn't responded in writing, so I think that 
the State needs to respond to the memorandum which 
we have submitted to the Court. Then based on 
their response we'll reply to that. 
THE COURT: Well, okay. Do you just want 
to hold yours for reply? 
MR. JEWELL: Well, I've raised four points 
in the memorandum. The State hasn't responded in 
writing. I think they need to respond to that 
before we can even make a reply. 
THE COURT: All right. If you don't want 
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1 to put forth your case, even though I have a 
2| memorandum. Sometimes Counsel likes to highlight 
parts of that memorandum, but if you want to hold 
it until reply then we'll have Mr, Madsen. 
MR. JEWELL: I'd need to know the States 
response in each of the points in the memorandum. 
I think we've laid out sufficiently the grounds for 
the motion. I think we've laid out why we believe 
the motion's overbroad, that it's unconstitutional 
that --
THE COURT: You said the motion's 
overbroad. You mean the search warrant? 
MR. JEWELL: The warrant's overbroad, 
correct. I think those are all laid out in the 
memoradum. I think they're laid out with extreme 
clarity. The State hasn't responded to any of 
that. 
THE COURT: The cases that you've cited, 
let me ask you some questions, then. The cases 
that you've cited does not go particularly to the 
search warrant itself and how broad that search 
warrant may be. Now, do you have any particular 
cases that limits the breadth of the search 
warrant? 
MR. JEWELL: I understand what you're 
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1 saying, because what has happened is the Courts 
2 have outlined what the standard is, but they have 
3 not necessarily applied that standard to a search 
4 warrant case. 
5 THE COURT: Well, let me narrow it down a 
6 little for you. As I read your memorandum it 
7 appears to me that you're attacking the search 
8 warrant itself, saying it's vague, too broad. It 
9 appears to me that you maybe ought to be attacking 
10 the conduct ot the police officers as going beyond 
11 the search warrant itself. 
12 MR. JEWELL: Well, I think as I stated in 
13 my memorandum, since the warrant is overbroad 
14 and therefore unconstitutional, the search is 
15 impermissible and violates both the Fourth 
16 Amendment and Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah 
17 Constitution. I think that's --
13 THE COURT: Now, where is the search 
19 warrant unconstitutional, with some particularity? 
20 MR. JEWELL: Well, for example, looking at 
2 1 the search warrant itself as it's attached as part 
22 of the addendum to the motion, it states, "Your --" 
23 y-o-u-r, "are also hereby (inaudible) to search of 
24 any out-buildings, curtilage, vehicles and the 
25 person of any individual present at the time of the 
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1 execution of this warrant." 
21 It fails to identify where these out-
3 buildings are located- It fails to identify where 
4 these vehicles are located. It fails to identify 
5 where these people are going to be located that 
6 should be searched. 
7 If the warrant wanted the people, out-
8 buildings and vehicles to be searched, those items 
9 present at the residence, it should have so stated. 
10 The way it's stated in the search warrant, it would 
11 allow someone to search the buildings of the next-
12 door neighbor, someone out on the street. It 
13 doesn't conform to the form of particularity 
14 required. 
15 THE COURT: You're going too fast for me. 
16 Where did you read from? 
17 MR. JEWELL: Okay. Are you looking at the 
18 last page of the search warrant? 
19 THE COURT: I am. 
20 MR. JEWELL: Okay. The paragraph where it 
21 states, "Now, therefore, you and each of you." 
22 THE COURT: Yeah. 
23 MR. JEWELL: If you'll look at the last 
24 sentence of that paragraph. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Okay, now go ahead and 
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1 tell me again what your problems are with that. 
2 MR. JEWELL: As that sentence is written, 
3 it is unclear as to where these people, out-
4 buildings or vehicles are located that are 
5 permitted to be searched by the warrant. 
6 If it meant the people, out vehicles and 
7 out-buildings at the residence, it should have so 
8 stated. But as it is stated in the warrant, it is 
9 unclear. If we are to follow through on the 
10 authority granted by this type of sentence, it 
11 would allow the police to search anyone on the 
12 sidewalk, the buildings of the neighbors next door, 
13 people who were in no way associated with that 
14 residence. 
15 Furthermore, there needs to be some 
16 particularity as to why these other people should 
17 be searched. As it is stated in the memorandum and 
18J case law, the Fourth Amendment protects people. 
19 How can a magistrate grant authority to search all 
20 people? There's got to be some particularity. 
21 There's got to be some probable cause, some reason 
22 to have those people searched. 
23 Now, on the affidavit, the affidavit cites 
24 that the police believe that Steven Hunley is 
25 selling drugs. When they go to search the garbage 
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can, they find four respondents to both Steven 
Hunley and Angela Hunley. There is no mention in 
the affidavit whatsoever of Mr, Shane Doyle. There 
is no mention in the search warrant of Mr. Shane 
Doyle. 
How can a magistrate grant broad authority 
to search any person that might be present at a 
place? There has to be particularity or a reason 
to search that particular person. It's not enough 
that someone there might be involved in the sale or 
usage of drugs. There has to be particularity as 
to that person. 
It's overbroad to allow anybody to be 
searched. That means if the grandparents were 
visiting for the weekend, they could be searched. 
That means the milkman who knocks on the door in 
ths morning can be searched. Anyone can be 
searched. That's too broad. 
THE COURT: So that's what you're saying 
this warrant says to you? 
MR. JEWELL: I'm saying that the warrant 
as written is overly broad. There's failure to 
establish particularity to search all persons 
present. 
Moreover, the warrant doesn't identify 
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1 where these people, vehicles or buildings are. 
2 It doesn't say that these people, vehicles and 
3 buildings are within the curtilage or at the 
4 residence or anything else. 
5 It's so broad that an officer could 
6 reasonably take the information provided in the 
7 warrant and go search areas that have nothing to do 
8 with that household or residence. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? 
10 MR. JEWELL: Yes, your Honor. Furthermore, 
li besides the fact that the warrant is overbroad and 
12 fails to establish with particularity the probable 
13 cause for why Mr. Doyle should be searched, when 
14 Mr. Doyle arrived at the residence, according to 
15 the officers who testified at preliminary hearing, 
16 he arrived anywhere from 40 minutes to an hour and 
17 lu minutes after they'd begun their search. 
18 The camera, the video camera they'd been 
19 using to film what was going on had been placed 
20 away. Essentially they had come to the end of 
21 their purpose for searching. The officers are not 
22 permitted to sit around the house and wait for 
23 three days to see who might show up. That's 
2 4 i m p e r m i s s i b l e . 
25 If they've fulfilled the purpose of their 
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1 search, there's no reason for them to stay there 
2| any longer. Therefore, the timing of the arrival 
3| of Mr. Doyle was after the timing as described in 
the warrant. According to the warrant it says --
last line of that paragraph, the last page of the 
warrant says, "At the time of the execution of this 
warrant." 
Well, when the officers went in to execute 
it, Mr. Doyle wasn't present. The people who were 
present were the two Hunleys and a child. By the 
time Mr. Doyle had arrived, as I stated earlier, 
anywere between 40 minutes to an hour and 15 
minutes after the officers had arrived at the 
house, the Hunleys had apparently been taken away. 
So had the child. The video camera had been put 
away. They were essentially done with the search. 
If the officers were allowed to remain 
there as long as they want, they could stay there 
several days and wait and see who shows up. That's 
not what this warrant is designed to do. The 
warrant is designed for a particular purpose. 
The purpose is to go and search the 
residence of these people, because they're the 
people against whom probable cause has been 
established, at least for the purposes of the 
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1 magistrate who signed the warrant. To allow them 
2 to go beyond that is unconstitutional. It's 
3 inappropriate and violates the Fourth Amendment and 
4 Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
5 The car in which Mr. Doyle arrived, 
6 according to the officers, was parked in front of 
7 not the Hunleys trailer, the trailer that's being 
8 searched, but rather in front of the neighbor's 
9 trailer. 
10 Even if the warrant is corrected by 
11 looking at what the affidavit states, the officers 
12 cannot reach that car because it's not within the 
13 curtilage of the home. It's out on the public 
14 street where other cars are parked. They do not 
15 have authority to go and search any car on the 
16i street. You need probable cause to search that 
17 car. 
18 It's not enougn that it states that a car 
19 present at the residence. If a car is not at the 
20 residence when they arrive, and even when they come 
21 out later to search the car it's still not at the 
22 residence, that's not appropriate. That would 
23 allow them to search any car on the public street 
24 within a few blocks of the residence. 
25 The warrant is overbroad, vague and 
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violates both the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, as the timing 
of the search of Mr. Doyle and the car violates the 
wording in the warrant as described, which states, 
"At the time of the execution of this warrant," and 
as the car was outside of the scope of the 
authority of the warrant. 
Even if you don't find the wording in the 
warrant is vague and unconstitutional, it's still 
outside the scope of the warrant because it's not 
parked at that property. It's parked away from the 
property on the street in front of the neighbor's 
house. 
We believe that anything that resulted 
from that search, such as statements from Mr. Doyle 
and any evidence derived there from the illegal and 
unconstitutional search should be suppressed as 
(inaudible)• 
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen. 
MR. MADSEN: Your Honor, I think the Court 
has began to sum up the State's position. The 
reason we haven't filed a response is I didn't 
really quite know what to respond to. 
The fact that a search warrant may not be 
overbroad is true. But in this case the search 
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1 warrant is very specific. The case law developed 
2 that you couldn't search individuals unless they 
3 were provided for in the search warrant. So 
4 they've gone to great pains to make sure that 
5 individuals present are included in the search 
6 warrant. 
7 The Court would have to find that a 
8 magistrate either is inherently without power to 
9 order the search of the individuals present at 
10j the cite of the search warrant, or that it is 
11 unconstitutional and overbroad to do so. It simply 
12 is not accurate. It is not overbroad and it is not 
13 unconstitutional for a magistrate to direct the 
14 search of individuals if there is some nexus. 
15 In this case, the cases cited, a primary 
16j case deals with a bar, where a search warrant was 
17 obtained for a bar and the bartender, and they 
18 searched all the patrons. They said that that was 
19 overbroad. This isn't a bar. This isn't a public 
20 place. This is a private residence, and the 
21 allegation was that they're dealing drugs out of 
22 the private residence. Now, that was what was 
23 presented to the magistrate. 
24 The Court would have to find that the 
25 magistrate is without power to issue a search 
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1 warrant that provides for the search of individuals 
2 at that scene, unnamed individuals- I think it's 
3 fatuous to argue that we didn't say where those 
4 individuals were. We don't know who those 
5 individuals are. We named the individuals that 
6 owned the property. We have no way of knowing in 
7 advance who will be present. 
8 Also, the argument that curtilage and 
3\ out-buildings are not described begs the fact that 
10 curtilage and out-building is a description. It is 
11 a term of art. It has a legal weaning. It is 
121 legally defined. Curtilage is a specific location, 
13 a specific place. It is its own definition. Out-
14 building is its own definition. Persons present 
15 and vehicles present carries its own definition. 
161 It is at the location of the search. 
171 The search is very specifically described. 
18 It's described by color. It's described by 
19 location. It's described by street address. It's 
20 described by number. It's very particular about 
21 what sites is being searched. That goes to the 
22 overbroad. 
23 The constitutional is the same argument. 
24 To reach an argument that it is unconstitutional 
25 for a magistrate to issue a search warrant that 
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1| provides for the search of persons present at a 
21 suspected site for the distribution of controlled 
3 substance is simply inaccurate, 
4 If they had provided information adequate 
5 for their warrant the magistrate does have the 
6 power to provide for the search of the persons 
7 named or unnamed who are present where the illegal 
8 activity is alleged to be occurring. 
9 It is not vague in the least. It names 
10 the location. It names curtilage, a legal term of 
11 art. It names out-buildings, a legal term of art. 
12 It names vehicles, which is clearly not overbroad. 
13 Everybody knows what a vehicle is. It names 
14 persons, which are real individuals that are 
15 present where that search is being conducted. If 
16 they are present where they have the legal right to 
17 search, they have the legal right to search them. 
18 As far as not being present at the scene 
19 or during the execution of the warrant, that 
20 warrant is being executed from the time the 
21 officers take possession of the property until the 
22 time that they relinquish possession of the 
23 property. That property is still in their control. 
24 To say that they should have been faster 
25 and should have been out completely begs the fact 
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1 that they were not. They were still in the 
2| execution of the warrant. The property was still 
under their control. 
To argue that the vehicle does not have a 
nexus to this search completely ignores the fact 
that this defendant arrived, went to the door, 
knocked on the door and entered the trailer where 
the search was being conducted. Only then to 
discover that the people who were inside were 
policemen. Not the people that he was there to 
see, who are the named suspected drug dealers. 
That they removed from this individual at 
that time drug paraphernalia. Then the defendant 
was placed under arrest. The nexus to the vehicle 
is that that's the vehicle that brought him to the 
scene. It is present at the scene. It's waiting 
for him. It's waiting for him to leave, and the 
officers searched it at the scene. 
THE COURT: Did he search with or without 
permission? As I understand he was a passenger, 
not the driver. 
MR. MADSEN: Well, they did not ask for 
permission to search the vehicle. Vehicles present 
during the search are named in the warrant. The 
search is still ongoing. The officers are still 
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1 present. They are still conducting the search. 
2 The premises is still under their control. 
3 Now, to draw to the (inaudible) that they 
4 are not entitled to sit there three days, that's 
5 entirely the question that they were not and did 
6 not. They didn't search the milkman. They didn't 
7 search the grandparents. They didn't search the 
8 pizza boy. They searched the individual who came 
9 and knocked on the door at the house where the 
10 allegations are that the people are sailing drugs 
11 to people that are doing exactly that. They're 
12 coming and knocking on the door and buying drugs. 
13 That's what this defendant did. He came 
14 inside the place, was searched, and paraphernalia 
15 was found. Illegal paraphernalia. When the 
16 vehicle was searched, three — I believe it was 
17 ounces or at least three baggies of methamphetamine 
181 were removed from the vehicle. The vehicle is 
19 there present at the site of the search because it 
20 delivered this defendant there. 
21 The testimony at the preliminary hearing 
22 was it was parked at the first available parking 
23 space. That there was already a vehicle in place 
24 directly in front, and it parked directly behind. 
25 It's as present as it can get, without parking on 
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1 top of another vehicle. It can't get any more 
2 present at the location where they were. 
3 It wasn't overbroad. It specifically 
4 named what can be searched. It wasn't vague. It 
5 specifically identifies it to say that it is too 
6 vague if it doesn't say who the people are and 
7 where they are. 
8 Defense counsel even wants a search 
9 warrant that says, "We will seek to search the 
lol following people, and this is where they are." 
11 Which means that from the -- the search warrant 
12 could be executed any time for ten full days. From 
13 the time it's prepared to magistrate approves it, 
14 it can be executed up to ten days later. 
15 To say that vagueness requires that we 
15 identify where people will be and which people will 
17i be there during that ten day period at the exact 
18 minute that the officers enter completely belies 
19 the legislative intent, it belies the language of 
20 the statute, and it belies the realities of the 
21 warrants. 
22 It isn't a warrant that's executable at 
23 one minute of one hour of one day, and you 
24 therefore must name everybody and where they'll be 
25 standing at the time that it's executed. There's 
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1 no way to know in that ten-day period who's going 
2 to be there when you get there. 
3 The nexus is provided by the affidavit, 
4 was presented to the magistrate, which says, "This 
5 is the activities that we believe is going on at 
6 this home. This is how they're conducting 
7 business. We want a warrant to allow us to search 
8 people who might be there, and the people who are 
9 listed as owning the place, and any out-buildings 
10 and vehicles and anything within the curtilage." 
11 That isn't overbroad. It isn't vague. 
12 It's not unconstitutional, and the fact that this 
13 defendant arrived an hour into the search -- if 
14 he'd arrived ten minutes into the search is that 
15 permissible? If he'd arrived one minute into the 
16 search. I mean, (inaudible) to discuss the three 
17i days that they say the officers weren't permitted 
18| to sit there. If he'd arrived as the officers hit 
19 the door or just after they hit the door, where do 
20 you draw the line? 
21 It's during the execution of the warrant. 
22 The magistrate made that clear. During the 
23 execution of this warrant you may search 
24 individuals that are present. He was there during 
25 the execution of the warrant. The officers still 
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1 had custody of the premises. He knocked. They 
2 opened the door. They're the ones that let him 
31 into the house. They still had custody and 
41 possession of it and the search is ongoing. 
I think all of those arguments fall by the 
facts. Not by what might have, could have, is 
argumentably possible in (inaudible), but what 
really did happen. What really happened is they 
got a warrant. They did what they were supposed to 
do. They provided information to the magistrate. 
They told the magistrate why they needed to search 
this place, search the buildings and search the 
individuals thct might be there. 
The magistrate agreed with them and gave 
them a warrant that named the building, the out-
buildings, the vehicles and persons that might be 
there. Not by name, but by car and location during 
the execution of the warrant at this site. They 
executed it exactly pursuant to the directions from 
the magistrate. At that site, persons who were 
present during the execution of the warrant. 
I believe that all of the arguments fail. 
The cases cited did not apply to name -- there are 
certain cases where individuals are searched where 
no individuals are named in the warrant. They have 
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1 a warrant for a location but not people. They 
2 search them. 
3 They says, "No, it protects people." So 
4 the officers have been instructed, "You can't 
5 search people unless you provide information to the 
6 magistrate and get a warrant for people." They 
7 did. 
8 Now it's overbroad because we couldn't 
9 tell the magistrate where in the building the 
10 people would be standing at the time that we did, 
11 where they would be. There's no way we can do 
121 that. There's no way it can ever be done. It's 
13 physically impossible. 
14 But they did exactly what they were 
15 supposed to do. They got exactly the kind of 
16 warrant they were supposed to get. They executed 
17 exactly the way they were supposed to do it. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Jewell. 
19 MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor. I 
20 think Mr. Madsen misunderstands our argument. Our 
21 argument is not that they have to particularize 
22 where in the building such people will be found. 
23 Our argument is that the wording in the 
24 warrant is overbroad because it states, I quote 
25 again, "Your are also hereby directed to search of 
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1 any out-buildings, curtilage, vehicles and the 
2J person of any individuals present at the time the 
3| execution of this warrant." 
4| It does not state where those people, 
5| where those vehicles, where those (inaudible) are. 
If the warrant had sought to search those people, 
out-buildings, vehicles present at the residence, 
it should have so stated. It did so in the 
affidavit but it doesn't do it in the warrant. 
The way the wording is in the warrant, 
that warrant would literally allow an officer to 
search someone who is standing on any yard next 
door. It doesn't say where this person is. It 
says, "the persons present at the time of the 
execution of the warrant." It doesn't say where 
they're presen. 
That's what's overbroad. That's what's 
unconstitutionally vague about this. That's why it 
violates both the Fourth Amendment, Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
There needs to be an establishment of 
probable cause as to search the people there. Just 
stating, "We want to search everyone there," mere 
presence is not enough. They need to establish 
probable cause to do that. 
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1 As the warrant is worded, it is overbroad. 
2 It would literally allow an officer to search 
3 around the neighborhood. It does not --
4 MR. MADSEN: But it --
5 MR. JEWELL: No. I'm sorry, this is my 
6 response. 
7 MR. MADSEN: You're sorry? I don't take my 
8 direction from you. If I stand up to object, I 
9 expect to address the Court. 
10 MR. JEWELL: Oh, I'm sorry. 1 didn't know 
11 you were going to object. I thought you were going 
12 to say something. 
13 MR. MADSEN: I've got to object at this 
14 point, your Honor. He keeps reading the last 
15 sentence. I think we've got to read the full 
16 paragraph. 
17 THE COURT: I've read the full paragraph. 
18 MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
19 MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, we have not stated 
20 that we think the description of the residence is 
21 vague. Our focus is on that last paragraph where 
22 it gives this broad authority to search people, 
23 vehicles and out-buildings without saying where 
24 those items are going to be found. 
25 As it is right now, it's unclear where 
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1 these people -- it would allow -- even though 
2 the officers did not search someone on the 
3 sidewalk, the problem isn't with the officers. 
4 The problem is the warrant's overbroad. It's 
5 unconstitutionally vague and it is overbroad. 
6 Another problem is the vehicle. That 
7 warrant -- even if it's written to say that they 
8 can search the vehicles at the residence -- and 
9 it's not written to say they can search vehicles at 
10 the residence. 
11 We need some clarity. According to the 
12 diagram drawn at the preliminary hearing, this is 
13 the trailer that's being searched. This is the pad 
14 to this trailer. This is the next-door neighbor's 
15 trailer. This in front -- so the next door 
16 neighbor's trailer is just south and lies just 
17 after the pad to the trailer being searched. 
18 In front of the neighbor's trailer is 
19 parked the vehicle. We'll call it the "suspect 
20 vehicle." How can the officers reach from this 
21 house to this suspect vehicle? There's no way. It 
22 doesn't fall within the warrant. 
23 Even assuming that the warrant had been 
24 written properly and said that the vehicles, the 
25 out-buildings, the persons or people present at the 
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1 residence, it's outside of the residential area. 
2 It's in front of the neighbor's vehicle. 
3 It doesn't matter that this might have 
4 been the parking spot available. Does that mean 
5 on the other side of the street a vehicle parked 
6 would qualify? Because according to the State's 
7 argument, that's what it would. Well, gee, it's 
8 the other residence (inaudible). That's the 
9 problem. It's overbroad. 
10 Even assuming that the -- excuse me. I 
11 irisstated myself. Even assuming that the warrant 
12 was written correctly and stated with specificity 
13 that it was referring to the people, out-buildings, 
14 the vehicles present at the residence, if the 
15 warrant stated that, even assuming that, this does 
16 not fall witnin that. This is outside of the 
17 residential area. 
18 According to what the State has argued, 
19 any car in the street would qualify. It doesn't 
20 matter if Mr. Doyle stepped out of that car. That 
21 doesn't matter. They still have to have probable 
22 cause to search the car. It's not enough he 
23 stepped out of that car. He's not even the driver 
24 of the car, for heaven's sakes. 
25 How can they jump from here to here? 
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l| Well, they're trying to say they do it through the 
2| warrant,. But the warrant doesn't give them that 
authority. The warrant was written improperly. 
You need to assume if it was written properly it 
would only include the cars within the residential 
area. This one doesn't qualify. Otherwise, the 
officers are entitled to search any car within who 
knows what distance of the residence. This car 
does not fall within this area. 
Now, if the warrant had been written the 
way the affidavit had been submitted, there would 
oe more clarity as to which cars, people and out-
buildings could be searched. The affidavit was 
more properly worded than the warrant. But even 
assuming it did use that exact same language, this 
car does not fall within the scope of the language 
even submitted in the affidavit. It is not at the 
residence. 
It doesn't matter if four people came out 
of the car and went to the residence and they were 
searched. This car doesn't fall within the scope 
of even what they asked for in the affidavit. If 
it did, if any car is subject to that, then that is 
completely unconstitutional, because it opens up a 
pandora's box to allow the police to just go search 
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anything because they think there might be a nexus. 
That's not enough. If they didn't get 
consent to search the car and there wasn't other 
reasons to get at the car -- and in this case 
apparently there wasn't because the driver of the 
car was someone else -- there's no way they could 
reach the search in that car. Therefore, anything 
they found in the car falls outside the scope of 
the warrant as it is, and even if the warrant were 
written correctly. The warrant as written is 
overbroad. It's unconstitutionally vague. 
At the time of the warrant we reitterate 
our argument that the defendant arrived substantial 
period of time after the execution of the warrant. 
Agreed, he didn't arrive one minute afterwards. He 
arrived anywhere from the officers 40 minute? to an 
hour and 15 minutes after the search had begun. 
If the State is allowed to just stay 
around forever, they could say, "Well, we're not 
done searching the place," and they could sit on 
it. In this case apparently they did not. But 
we're not looking at what they did in this case. 
We're looking at what authority the warrant 
granted. 
Our argument is the authority granted by 
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1 the warrant is overbroad, unconstitutionally vague, 
2 and that the car in this matter falls outside the 
3| scope of the warrant, even if it was corrected 
through the affidavit, 
THE COURT: Let me ask you a question. 
Suppose that the actual owners of the property had 
their cars parked across the street because there 
was no place to park in front of their mobile home. 
Would your argument be that they could not search 
those vehicles? 
MR, JEWELL: I think that if the car was 
parked outside the residence of the home and they 
didn't state that they wanted to get at the car, I 
don't know that they could get at the car because 
it's still parked outside that area. They're only 
granted so much authority by the warrant. 
I think in that case they'd have a better 
argument to have gotten at it through consent of 
the owners of the car or by some other means than 
issue under the search warrant, because frankly 
they'd already called the people off the property. 
They can ask for a search warrant to search the car 
itself. 
In this case we have a person who arrives 
in the car with someone else driving, and parked 
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1 away from the residence. The warrant does not 
2 grant them the authority to search that car, 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Madsen, do you want 
4 to be heard? 
5 MR. MADSEN: Yes, very briefly, your Honor. 
6 If you take that paragraph in its totality, it is a 
7 description of what can be searched. 
8 THE COURT: I'm not going to --
9 MR. MADSEN: When you get to curtilage, it 
10 has to be the curtilage of something. 
11 THE COURT: Sure. 
12 MR. MADSEN: If it's out-building it 
13 has to be of something. The other is phrased as 
14 "present." There is only one parking pad for this 
15 trailer. Everybody else who's present has to be on 
16 the street or on top of that car. 
17 Now the question is, "What does 'present' 
18 mean?" If the owner's car is there is it present 
19 at this residence? Of course it is. If the 
20 individual who comes up and knocks on that door to 
21 gain entry is there in a vehicle, is it present at 
22 that residence? Of course it is. 
23 All of that is very carefully spelled out 
24 in this warrant. It is not overbroad. It is not 
25 vague. To argue that it has to be physically up on 
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1 the property and named in advance is impossible. 
2 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Jewell? 
3| MR. JEWELL: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: In this case, the Court reading 
the paragraph in its totality is convinced that it 
is not broad, too broad or vague. That the general 
refers back to general modified by the specific. 
Even though the terms out-buildings, curtilage and 
vehicles are general in nature, it has to be 
modified by the description of the property that is 
there. 
This property is not only described by an 
address. It's described by color. It's described 
by the numerals 121 of the trim, with the main 
entrance facing south. I can't see that anyone 
would think that that: should be vague or too broad 
under the circumstances, when you go back and read 
tne paragraph in its entirety. 
Court finds that the magistrate has the 
constitutional right to issue a warrant which calls 
for the search of the curtilage, the vehicles and 
the persons of any individuals present at the time 
of the execution of the warrant. 
Execution of the warrant does not mean the 
moment that the warrant is handed to the owners of 
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1 the property. The execution of that warrant begins 
2 at that point in time when the officers enter the 
3 premises, and it terminates when the officers 
4 leave. 
5 Up to that point in time, if we have a 
6 situation such as this, where a person comes to 
7 that door and then enters into that property, then 
8 it would appear to me that they have all the right 
9 in the world to search that person. 
10| If that person had nothing on him, if he 
11 had no illegal drugs, no illegal paraphernalia, 
12 then the officers would not have any right to 
13 search a vehicle. 
14 But the nexus, as Mr. Madsen has 
15 indicated, is the fact that he had drugs -- or 
16 rather drug paraphernalia on him. Illegal drug 
17 paraphernalia. And this is the nexus that gives 
18 them the opportunity. It's this Court's ruling it 
19 gives them the right, not unconstitutional but the 
20 absolute right to search that vehicle to make a 
21 determination if there is any further drugs. Once 
22 he's placed under arrest they certainly have the 
23 right to do that. 
24 I don't know who owned the vehicle. I 
25 don't know who the driver was. I don't know if any 
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permission was ever asked of anybody, but the nexus 
there and the case law in this Court's opinion is 
pretty clear that authorizes them to do that. 
Have I addressed everything? 
MR. JEWELL: I believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen, will you prepare an 
order consistent with this Court's ruling? 
MR. MADSEN: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jewell to approve form. 
Send it to the Court. 
MR. MADSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor. 
I'm sorry, your Honor. There was 
something else, before Mr. Madsen leaves. My 
client wanted me to address the Court regarding 
bail. Are we still on the record? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. JEWELL: Okay, thank you. Your Honor, 
Mr. Doyle has indicated that he would like the 
Court to consider lowering bail in this matter. 
He's not asking the Court to OR him, but lower the 
bail so that he might have the opportunity to go 
out and take care of some matters. 
He indicates that if he were released on a 
-- if there were a lower bail imposed and he were 
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1 able to make that and be released, he would go live 
2 at an address of 293 North 850 West in Orem. 
3 That's a place where he has lived since July of 
4 '94. 
5 He also believes that he could return to 
6 work for Chadwick Masonry in Provo where he worked 
7 for approximately a year full-time. He's also 
3 indicated that he's worked construction in this 
9 valley for approximately 15 years. 
10 I think, according to --
11 THE COURTS Well, before you go any 
12 further, the bindover on this says he's on OR on 
13 this case. 
14 MR. JEWELL: On this one? 
15 MR. DOYLE: I've been at the county jail 
16 since November 11th on this ce.se with £ $4,000 
17 bondable bail. 
18| THE COURT: Well, jusr. let me look throuqh 
19 the file further. The bindover says, "Bail, ROR 
20 this case. Remanded to county jail on other 
2 1 charges . " 
22 MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, Mr. Doyle 
23 indicates that he believes Judge Dimick in Orem 
24 said that you would entertain bail on another 
25 matter based on what happens on bail on this. | 
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1 Frankly I don't have any independent 
2| recollection of anything. What I do have in the 
notes I have are $4,000 bond, $2,000 cash on the 
30th of November. I do not recall whether or not 
the status on that changed. 
So you're saying as far as this Court's 
concerned he is OR'd on this matter? 
THE COURT: Well, let me go back further 
here. You might have some merit in what you're 
saying. North circuit court -- oh, here we go. 
Bail is set at 2,000 cash, 4,000 bond. That was at 
a preliminary on December 15th. The bindover, for 
whatever reason --
MR. JEWELL: Is that — 
THE COURT: See if there's anything in the 
notes that addresses that. The note itself taken 
during the preliminary examination doesn't say 
anything that I can see. 
So I don't know why we have the conflict 
that bail 2,000 cash, 4,000 bond, and then the 
bindover in the case that he's ROR this case 
remanded to Utah County on other charges. 
MR. JEWELL: The end notes I have from the 
bindover is just that Counts I and III were bound 
over and Count II was dismissed (inaudible) for 
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1[ this, but I don't have anything reflecting the 
2| issue of bail at that time. I don't know if the 
3 State has anything different. 
4 MR. MADSEN: The last thing I have shows 
5 $4,000 bond, $2,000 cash. 
6 THE COURT: Apparently there is some 
7 conflict on the case. So what's your proposal on 
8 the bail? 
9 MR. JEWELL: Your Honor, he's suggested an 
10 amount maybe in the line of $1,000. He believes 
11 that's a bond that he'd be able to make. 
12 MR. MADSEN: Your Honor. 
13| THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Madscn. 
14 MR. MADSEN: Your Honor, the criminal 
15 history shows five arrests with two convictions. 
lo' One of which was for a drug related offense. The 
17 quantity of drug which was removed from the vehicle 
181 was substantial. Beyond that I know nothing about 
19 the defendant. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. Do you want to tell me a 
21 little bit about him. 
22 MR. JEWELL: About what? 
23 THE COURT: Your client. 
24 MR. JEWELL: Well, I told you -- what else 
25 did you want to know? I told you about his work 
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1 situation, where he'd go. 
2| THE COURT: Give me a little bit about his 
criminal background, whether he has a family he's 
living with. 
MR. JEWELL: Right. He has family here in 
Utah valley. He's indicated in the past that as 
far as there was a possession of cocaine charge 
back in either '88 or '89, a Class A misdemeanor 
for something, three DUI's, a felony assault in 
Wyoming. He says he has had no charges since 1989. 
The only thing that he would have would be possibly 
a retail theft in Orem, and he's supposed to have a 
trial on that. 
THE COURT: And he's married? 
MR. DOYLE: I'm currently separated, your 
Honor. I have two children that are in my custody. 
THE COURT: In your custody? 
MR. DOYLE: Yes. 
THE COURT: And Where's your ex-wife? 
MR. DOYLE: She's living in Provo. She has 
the children right now but upon ray release I will 
probably take them over. She voluntarily gave me 
custody of the children. 
THE COURT: Mr. Madsen, do you have any 
suggestions? 
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MR. MADSEN: Most of what I'm looking a 
is from the A's with the cocaine charge in late 
'89, but I also have an August charge of false 
information, with no official determination yet 
I don't think that a few thousand doll 
bail for anyone with local contacts, if we make 
that cash or bond assurety, it's not only 
reasonable bail, it's quite low for the charge. 
THE COURT: I'll reduce it to $2,000 ca 
bond or assurety* 
MR. JEWELL: Thank you, your Honor. 
(Hearing concluded) 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Love, a Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were 
transcribed under my direction from the electronic 
tape recording made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true and 
correct and contains all of the evidence, all of 
the objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court 
and all matters to which the same relate which were 
audible through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested 
in the outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified 
in th-2 record, and therefore the name associated 
with the statement may not be the correct name as 
to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 23rd day of 
February 1995. 
• x 
My commission expires: • .- ~* 
February 24, 1996 [. ./-.N / • •/** 
NOT£R?~PUBLIjer 
res iq.JLng._i-n'- ut a h ._ couh t y 
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ADDENDUM 6 
Conditional Plea Agreement 
MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, 9tata of Utah 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OP UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Defendants, 
CONDITIONAL (SERY) PLEA AGREEMENT 
AND CERTIFICATION 
Case No. 941400879 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
COMES NOW Defendant, personally and by and through his attorney 
of record, Michael E. Jewell, and the State of Utah, by and through 
:ts attorney, Craig R. Madsen, Deputy Utah County Attorney, who hereby 
stipulate, covenant and agree as follows: 
1. Defendant is charged in Count I of the Information filed in this 
matter with Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone with 
Intent to Distribute, a First Degree Felony, and in Count III with 
Unlawful Possession of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone, a Class 
A Misdemeanor (Count II was dismissed in the Circuit Court). 
2. Defendant has filed his Motion to Suppress supported by 
Memorandum, challenging both the search warrant and the subsequent 
search which allegedly provided evidence to support the above two 
counts. 
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3. Having fully reviewed the memorandum of Defendant and 
arguments of the parties, this Court has denied Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress. 
4. The State of Utah, in the interest of justice has agreed to 
dismiss Count III in consideration of Defendant's conditional plea of 
No Contest to an amended Count I, Possession of Methamphetamine in a 
Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony. 
5. The conditions of Defendant's plea are those allowed by the 
holding of State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), to wit: 
a) Defendant's plea specifically preserves the issues raised 
in his Motion to Suppress for appeal. 
b) Defendant may withdraw his plea if his arguments for 
suppression are accepted by the appropriate appellate court. 
c) The disposition of Defendant's appeal will effectively 
bring the litigation of this matter to an end one, if Defendant is 
successful in his appeal he will be allowed to withdraw his plea and 
the State of Utah will dismiss all counts filed against him, or two, 
while if Defendant is not successful in his appeal judgment will be 
entered against him in accordance with his plea; 
d) No other issues remain unresolved in this matter which 
would prevent this case from being totally and finally resolved upon a 
determination of Defendant's appeal of this Court's denial of his 
Motion to Suppress. 
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Dated this /" day of February, 1995. 
CERTIFICATION 
Consistent with State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Ut. App. 1988), 
State v. Montova, 858 P.2d 1027 (Utah App. 1993), State v. Harris, 858 
p.2d 1031 (Ut. App. 1993), and State v. Rivera, 871 P.2d 1023 (Ut. 
App. 1994), this Court hereby certifies that the foregoing Conditional 
Plea Agreement entered into by and between the State of Utah and 
Defendant, Shane Doyle, is in the interests of justice and further 
that such plea will effectively bring litigation in this matter to an « 
end, in that if Defendant is successful in his appeal, he will be 
allowed to withdraw his plea and the State of Utah will dismiss all 
counts filed against him, while if Defendant is not successful in his 
appeal, judgment will be entered against him in accordance with his 
plea. 
Such plea is accordingly approved and adopted by this Court and 
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Defendant is hereby reserved his right to appeal this Court's denial 
of h^£ Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
DATED this /f) day of February, 1995. 
>URT: 
Judg£ Boyd L. Park 
ADDENDUM 7 
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
fvtortrt F ILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County. State of Utah 
CARMA B. SMITH, Clerk 
| ^ F I L E D / ^ ) / ^ ^ 
MICHAEL E . JEWELL (6254) Fourth Judicial District Court 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION of Utah County, Stata of War 
40 S o u t h 100 W e s t , S u i t e 200 6-fT^5 B ' S M r r H ' C t e f k 
Provo, UT 84601 ^ n ' 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 7 9 - 2 5 7 0 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Qp"i*'.'> 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHANE DOYLE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Case No. 941400879 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
This matter came before the Court for a Suppression Hearing, the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding, on January 31, 1995. The Defendant 
was present and represented by Michael E. Jewell, Utah County Public 
Defender Association, Attorneys for Defendant. The plaintiff was 
represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney, Craig Madsen. The Court 
having reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum and having heard 
argument from both Plaintiff and Defendant and being advised in the 
premises does hereby make and enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1) The general language of the warrant refers back to the 
specific language of the warrant--the terms out-building, curtilage 
and vehicles are modified by the description of the property. 
2) The property in the warrant is described by address, color, 
numerals and the direction which the main entrance faces. 
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3) Defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person. 
4) The Court did not find who owned the vehicle, who the driver 
was or whether permission was asked to search the vehicle. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1) The authority-granting paragraph in the warrant in its 
totality is neither too broad or vague. 
2) The magistrate has the constitutional right to issue a warrant 
which calls for the search of the curtilage, the vehicles and the 
persons of any individuals present at the time of the execution of the 
warrant. 
3) Execution of the warrant does not mean the moment that the 
warrant is handed to the owner of the property, but rather the 
execution of that warrant begins at that point in time when the 
officers enter the premises, and it terminates when the officers 
leave. 
4) Up to the point in time when the officers leave, they have the 
right to search a person who comes to that door and then enters into 
that property. 
5) The fact that Defendant had drug paraphernalia on his person 
gives the police the right to search that vehicle to make a 
determination if there are any further drugs. 
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ORDER 
The Court, having reviewed Defendant's Motion and Memorandum and 
having heard argument from both Plaintiff and Defendant and being 
fully advised in the premises does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE: 
That Defendant's Motion to Suppress be Denied. 
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